Efficient growth factor production stabilizes cooperation in a cellular public goods game

Abstract

Eukaryotic cells secrete growth factors that facilitate the proliferation and survival of neighboring cells in a coordinated manner essential for tissue development, repair, and homeostasis. However, mutant cells that fail to produce these factors may exploit the benefits provided by neighboring producers, thereby gaining a proliferative advantage that could lead to the extinction of the producer clone. Evolutionary theory predicts that preventing this "tragedy of the commons" requires a fixed spatial structure or other mechanisms that enable cells to interact preferentially with copies of themselves. Contrary to this expectation, we found that, in competition experiments, cells producing the diffusible growth factor interleukin-3 (IL3) resist invasion by non-producing mutant cells even in well-mixed populations, and that non-producers are driven to extinction instead. Using evolutionary game theory, we show that this outcome arises when the cost-to-benefit ratio of growth factor production falls below a critical threshold. We derive this tipping point analytically across the full parameter space of benefit function shape and group size and confirm that IL3 production in our experimental system satisfies this condition with a production cost less than 0.1% of the benefit conferred. These results demonstrate that efficient public good production alone can resolve the tragedy of the commons in populations of cells, and potentially in other biological systems.