Strong leaders promote cooperation in heterogeneous populations

Abstract

Many proposed mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation among unrelated individuals rely on relatively demanding cognitive abilities that are not widespread across taxa. In contrast, individual heterogeneity is a pervasive feature of animal groups, encompassing differences in personality as well as physical and cognitive traits. Such heterogeneity can promote the evolution of cooperation, yet its role has received comparatively little attention, particularly as a source of variation giving rise to social organization such as leadership. A specific form of leadership can emerge under unstable environmental conditions, when some individuals become better suited than others to initiate action and influence the behavior of their peers. Unlike fixed dominance hierarchies, emergent leadership can rapidly adjust to changing environmental conditions, thereby reshaping group organization. Because it does not require the maintenance of stable hierarchies, this form of leadership can arise even in species that do not have the cognitive capabilities to sustain complex social structures. In this work, we investigate the combined effects of individual heterogeneity and emergent leadership on the evolution of cooperation using an evolutionary game-theoretic model in which individuals may assume the roles of leaders or followers according to their strength, representing individual differences in suitability to prevailing environmental conditions. We examine different levels of population heterogeneity together with increasingly complex strategy sets requiring progressively greater informational requirements, allowing individuals to condition cooperation on their own strength, leadership role, or both. Our results show that the interplay between leadership and heterogeneity promotes the evolution of cooperation, particularly when only a small fraction of individuals act as leaders. Under these circumstances, cooperation evolves even when individuals employ the simplest possible strategies. Under harsher ecological conditions, cooperation can be sustained by more sophisticated strategies, specifically by conditional strategies that prescribe cooperation when individuals are strong or leading and defect when acting independently. Author summaryIn this study, we propose that emergent leadership mediated by individual diversity can boost the evolution of cooperation in animal groups. Building on growing evidence on the heterogeneity of animal capabilities and personalities, we focus on the fleeting leadership that emerges in animal groups when facing rapidly changing environmental conditions. We suggest that this type of leadership that emerges from individual differences in strength--a generic quality encompassing those characteristics that make an individual more fit to lead in a given situation--does not require complex cognitive capabilities from the animals and represents a valid alternative to more demanding strategies proposed in the past to explain the evolution of cooperation. Using an evolutionary game theory model, we show that if a population includes a few strong players, these can become influential leaders and guide the actions of their peers to achieve cooperation. Although the naive strategy of always cooperating is sufficient for cooperation to evolve, the introduction of more complex strategies leads players to cooperate only when they are more likely to be recognized as influential leaders. These strategies are more effective in promoting cooperation under unfavorable ecological conditions and are also more robust against exploitation by defectors.