Controllability Governs the Balance Between Pavlovian and Instrumental Action Selection

Abstract

A Pavlovian bias to approach reward-predictive cues and avoid punishment-predictive cues can conflict with instrumentally-optimal actions. While most previous work has assumed that this bias is a fixed trait, we argue that it can vary within an individual. In particular, we propose that the brain arbitrates between Pavlovian and instrumental control by inferring which is a better predictor of reward. The instrumental predictor is more flexible; it can learn values that depend on both stimuli and actions, whereas the Pavlovian predictor learns values that depend only on stimuli. The arbitration theory predicts that the Pavlovian predictor will be favored when rewards are relatively uncontrollable, because the additional flexibility of the instrumental predictor is not useful. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that the Pavlovian approach bias is stronger under low control compared to high control contexts.