Maximizing cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma evolutionary game via optimal control

Abstract

The prisoners dilemma (PD) game offers a simple paradigm of competition between two players who can either cooperate or defect. Since defection is a strict Nash equilibrium, it is an asymptotically stable state of the replicator dynamical system that uses the PD payoff matrix to define the fitness landscape of two interacting evolving populations. The dilemma arises from the fact that the average payoff of this asymptotically stable state is sub-optimal. Coaxing the players to cooperate would result in a higher payoff for both. Here we develop an optimal control theory for the prisoners dilemma evolutionary game in order to maximize cooperation (minimize the defector population) over a given cycle-time T, subject to constraints. Our two time-dependent controllers are applied to the off-diagonal elements of the payoff matrix in a bang-bang sequence that dynamically changes the game being played by dynamically adjusting the payoffs, with optimal timing that depends on the initial population distributions. Over multiple cycles nT (n > 1), the method is adaptive as it uses the defector population at the end of the nth cycle to calculate the optimal schedule over the n + 1st cycle. The control method, based on Pontryagins maximum principle, can be viewed as determining the optimal way to dynamically alter incentives and penalties in order to maximize the probability of cooperation in settings that track dynamic changes in the frequency of strategists, with potential applications in evolutionary biology, economics, theoretical ecology, and other fields where the replicator system is used. PACS numbers02.50.Le; 02.30.Yy; 05.45.-a; 87.23.Kg; 87.23.Cc