bioRxiv Science⌕ Search

bioRxiv · 10.1101/062976

Competition between continuously evolving lineages in asexual populations

Abstract

In an asexual population, the fate of a beneficial mutation depends on how its lineage competes against other mutant lineages in the population. With high beneficial mutation rates or large population sizes, competition between contending mutations is strong, and successful lineages can accumulate multiple mutations before any single one achieves fixation. Most current theory about asexual population dynamics either neglects this multiple-mutations regime or introduces simplifying assumptions that may not apply. Here, we develop a theoretical framework that describes the dynamics of adaptation and substitution over all mutation-rate regimes by conceptualizing the population as a collection of continuously adapting lineages. This model of \"lineage interference\" shows that each new mutants advantage over the rest of the population must be above a critical threshold in order to likely achieve fixation, and we derive a simple expression for that threshold. We apply this framework to examine the role of beneficial mutations with different effect sizes across the transition to the multiple-mutations regime.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

Explore connections, maps & timelines

BibTeXRIS

Noah Ribeck, Joseph S. Mulka, Luis Zaman, Brian D. Connelly, Richard E. Lenski. 2016-07-10. Competition between continuously evolving lineages in asexual populations. https://doi.org/10.1101/062976

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related preprints

Evolutionary successful strategies in a transparent iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

A Transparent game is a game-theoretic setting that takes action visibility into account. In each round, depending on the relative timing of their actions, players have a certain probability to see their partners choice before making their own decision. This probability is determined by the level of transparency. At the two extremes, a game with zero transparency is equivalent to the classical simultaneous game, and a game with maximal transparency corresponds to a sequential game. Despite the prevalence of intermediate transparency in many everyday interactions such scenarios have not been sufficiently studied. Here we consider a transparent iterated Prisoners dilemma (iPD) and use evolutionary simulations to investigate how and why the success of various strategies changes with the level of transparency. We demonstrate that non-zero transparency greatly reduces the set of successful memory-one strategies compared to the simultaneous iPD. For low and moderate transparency the classical "Win - Stay, Lose - Shift" (WSLS) strategy is the only evolutionary successful strategy. For high transparency all strategies are evolutionary unstable in the sense that they can be easily counteracted, and, finally, for maximal transparency a novel "Leader-Follower" strategy outperforms WSLS. Our results provide a partial explanation for the fact that the strategies proposed for the simultaneous iPD are rarely observed in nature, where high levels of transparency are common.

Evolutionary Biology↗

Spontaneous whole-genome duplication restores fertility in interspecific hybrids

Interspecies hybrids often show advantages over parents but suffer from reduced fertility, which can sometimes be overcome through sexual reproduction that sorts out incompatibilities. Sex is however inefficient due to the low viability or fertility of hybrid offspring and thus limits their evolutionary potential. Mitotic cell division could be an alternative to fertility recovery in facultative sexual species. To test this, we evolved under relaxed selection more than 600 diploid yeast hybrids between species that span 100,000 to 15 M years of divergence. We find that hybrids can recover fertility spontaneously and rapidly through whole-genome duplication. These events occurred in both hybrids between young and well-established species. Our results show that the instability of hybrid ploidy is a spontaneous path to fertility recovery. One Sentence SummaryPloidy changes potentiate hybrid speciation by leading to fertility recovery.

Evolutionary Biology↗

Using the Price equation to analyze multi-level selection on the reproductive policing mechanism of bacterial plasmids

The replication control system of non-conjugative bacterial plasmids constitutes a simple and elegant example of a reproductive policing mechanism that moderates competition in the intra-cellular replication pool and establishes a mutually beneficial partnership among plasmids within a bacterial host and between plasmids and their hosts. The emergence of these partnerships is a product of the conflict between the evolutionary interests of hosts, who seek to maximize their growth rates within the population, and plasmids, who seek to maximize their growth rates within hosts. We employ a multi-scale computational model describing the growth, division and death of hosts, as well as the independent replication of plasmids within hosts, in order to investigate the implications of this conflict for the evolution of the plasmid replication parameters. We apply the multi-level form of the Price equation in order to quantify and elucidate the various selective pressures that drive the evolution of plasmid replication control. Our analysis shows how the evolution of the constituent components of the plasmid replication control system are shaped by selection acting at the level of hosts and the level of plasmids. In addition, we calculate finer-grained selective pressures that are attributed to atomic plasmid-related events (such as intra-cellular replication and plasmid loss due to host death) and demonstrate their special role at the early stages of the evolution of policing. Our approach constitutes a novel application of the Price equation for discerning and discussing the synergies between the levels of selection given the availability of a mechanistic model for the generation of the systems dynamics. We show how the Price equation, particularly in its multi-level form, can provide significant insight by quantifying the relative importance of the various selective forces that shape the evolution of policing in bacterial plasmids.

Evolutionary Biology↗