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van Gaal, S.

Publications and source records attributed to van Gaal, S..

25 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

Representational Dynamics Preceding Conscious Access

Our senses are continuously bombarded with more information than our brain can process up to the level of awareness. The present study aimed to enhance understanding on how attentional selection shapes conscious access under conditions of rapidly changing input. Using an attention task, EEG, and multivariate decoding of individual target- and distractor-defining features, we specifically examined dynamic changes in the representation of targets and distractors as a function of conscious access and the task-relevance (target or distractor) of the preceding item in the RSVP stream. At the behavioral level, replicating previous work and suggestive of a flexible gating mechanism, we found a significant impairment in conscious access to targets (T2) that were preceded by a target (T1) followed by one or two distractors (i.e., the attentional blink), but striking facilitation of conscious access to targets shown directly after another target (i.e., lag-1 sparing and blink reversal). At the neural level, conscious access to T2 was associated with enhanced early- and late-stage T1 representations and enhanced late-stage D1 representations, and interestingly, could be predicted based on the pattern of EEG activation well before T1 was presented. Yet, across task conditions, we did not find convincing evidence for the notion that conscious access is affected by rapid top-down selection-related modulations of the strength of early sensory representations induced by the preceding visual event. These results cannot easily be explained by existing accounts of how attentional selection shapes conscious access under rapidly changing input conditions, and have important implications for theories of the attentional blink and consciousness more generally.

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Pupil dilation and P3 reflect subjective surprise about decision outcome

Central to human and animal cognition is the ability to learn from feedback in order to optimize future rewards. Such a learning signal might be encoded and broadcasted by the brains arousal systems, including the noradrenergic locus coeruleus. Pupil responses and the positive slow wave component of event-related potentials reflect rapid changes in the arousal level of the brain. Here we ask whether and how these variables may reflect surprise: the mismatch between ones expectation about being correct and the outcome of a decision, when expectations fluctuate due to internal factors (e.g., engagement). We show that during an elementary decision-task in the face of uncertainty both physiological markers of phasic arousal reflect surprise. We further show that pupil responses and slow wave ERP are unrelated to each other, and that prediction error computations depend on feedback awareness. These results further advance our understanding of the role of central arousal systems in decision-making under uncertainty.

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Decreased alertness reconfigures cognitive control networks

Humans remarkable capacity to flexibly adapt their behaviour based on rapid situational changes is termed cognitive control. Intuitively, cognitive control is thought to be affected by the state of alertness, for example, when drowsy we feel less capable of adequately implementing effortful cognitive tasks. Although scientific investigations have focused on the effects of sleep deprivation and circadian time, little is known about how natural daily fluctuations in alertness in the regular awake state affect cognitive control. Here we combined a conflict task in the auditory domain with EEG neurodynamics to test how neural and behavioural markers of conflict processing are affected by fluctuations in alertness. Using a novel computational method, we segregated alert and drowsy trials from two testing sessions and observed that, although participants (both sexes) were generally sluggish, the typical Conflict Effect reflected in slower responses to conflicting information compared to non-conflicting information was still intact, as well as the moderating effect of previous conflict (Conflict Adaptation). However, the typical neural markers of cognitive control-local midfrontal-theta band power changes-that participants show during full alertness were no longer noticeable when alertness decreased. Instead, when drowsy, we found an increase in long-range information sharing (connectivity) between brain regions in the same frequency band. These results show the resilience of the human cognitive control system when affected by internal fluctuations of alertness, and suggest neural compensatory mechanisms at play in response to physiological pressure during diminished alertness. Significance StatementThe normal variability in alertness we experience in daily tasks is rarely taking into account in cognitive neuroscience. Here we studied neurobehavioral dynamics of cognitive control with decreasing alertness. We used the classic Simon Task where participants hear the word "left" or "right" in the right or left ear, eliciting slower responses when the word and the side are incongruent - the conflict effect. Participants performed the task both while fully awake and while getting drowsy, allowing for the characterisation of alertness modulating cognitive control. The changes in the neural signatures of conflict from local theta oscillations to a long-distance distributed theta network suggests a reconfiguration of the underlying neural processes subserving cognitive control when affected by alertness fluctuations.

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The brain detects stimulus features, but not stimulus conflict in task-irrelevant sensory input

Cognitive control over conflicting sensory input is central to adaptive human behavior. It might therefore not come as a surprise that past research has shown conflict detection in the absence of conscious awareness. This would suggest that the brain may detect conflict fully automatically, and that it can even occur without paying attention. Contrary to this intuition, we show that task-relevance is crucial for conflict detection. Univariate and multivariate analyses on electroencephalographic data from human participants revealed that when auditory stimuli are fully task-irrelevant, the brain disregards conflicting input entirely, whereas the same input elicits strong neural conflict signals when task-relevant. In sharp contrast, stimulus features were still processed, irrespective of task-relevance. These results show that stimulus properties are only integrated to allow conflict to be detected by prefrontal regions when sensory information is task-relevant and therefore suggests an attentional bottleneck at high levels of information analysis.

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How the level of reward awareness changes the computational and electrophysiological signatures of reinforcement learning

The extent to which subjective awareness influences reward processing, and thereby affects future decisions is currently largely unknown. In the present report, we investigated this question in a reinforcement-learning framework, combining perceptual masking, computational modeling and electroencephalographic recordings (human male and female participants). Our results indicate that degrading the visibility of the reward decreased -without completely obliterating- the ability of participants to learn from outcomes, but concurrently increased their tendency to repeat previous choices. We dissociated electrophysiological signatures evoked by the reward-based learning processes from those elicited by the reward-independent repetition of previous choices and showed that these neural activities were significantly modulated by reward visibility. Overall, this report sheds new light on the neural computations underlying reward-based learning and decision-making and highlights that awareness is beneficial for the trial-by-trial adjustment of decision-making strategies.\n\nSignificance statementThe notion of reward is strongly associated with subjective evaluation, related to conscious processes such as \"pleasure\", \"liking\" and \"wanting\". Here we show that degrading reward visibility in a reinforcement learning task decreases -without completely obliterating- the ability of participants to learn from outcomes, but concurrently increases subjects tendency to repeat previous choices. Electrophysiological recordings, in combination with computational modelling, show that neural activities were significantly modulated by reward visibility. Overall, we dissociate different neural computations underlying reward-based learning and decision-making, which highlights a beneficial role of reward awareness in adjusting decision-making strategies.

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Stimulus predictability does not modulate bottom-up attentional capture

Attention can be involuntarily captured by physically salient stimuli, a phenomenon known as bottom-up attention. Typically, these salient stimuli occur unpredictably in time and space. Therefore, in a series of three behavioral experiments, we investigated the extent to which such bottom-up attentional capture is a function of ones prior expectations. In the context of an exogenous cueing task, we systematically manipulated participants spatial (Experiment 1) or temporal (Experiment 2 and 3) expectations about an uninformative cue, and examined the extent of attentional capture by the cue. We anticipated larger attentional capture for unexpected compared to expected cues. However, while we observed robust attentional capture in all experiments, we did not find any evidence for a modulation of attentional capture by prior expectation. This underscores the automatic and reflexive nature of bottom-up attention.

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Dynamic interactions between top-down expectations and conscious awareness

It is well known that top-down expectations affect perceptual processes. Yet, remarkably little is known about the relationship between expectations and conscious awareness We address three crucial questions that are outstanding: 1) How do predictions affect the likelihood of conscious stimulus perception?; 2) Does the brain register violations of predictions nonconsciously?; and 3) Do predictions need to be conscious to influence perceptual decisions? We performed three experiments in which we manipulated stimulus predictability within the attentional blink paradigm, while combining visual psychophysics with electrophysiological recordings. We found that valid stimulus expectations increase the likelihood of conscious access of stimuli. Furthermore, our findings suggest a clear dissociation in the interaction between expectations and consciousness: conscious awareness seems crucial for the implementation of top-down predictions, but not for the bottom-up generation of stimulus-evoked prediction errors. These results constrain and update influential theories about the role of consciousness in the predictive brain.

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