bioRxiv Science⌕ Search

Biology subjects

Vermeylen, L.

Publications and source records attributed to Vermeylen, L..

5 recordsLinked to original sources

Neurally-informed modelling unravels a single evidence accumulation process for choices and subsequent confidence reports

How is the content of our decision making processes translated into subjective confidence? Current computational models designed to account for choice- and confidence-reporting behaviour disagree on two fundamental questions: do choice and confidence reports arise from shared versus distinct evaluation processes and what stopping-rule is applied to evidence sampling for confidence reports? Here, we employed a neurally-informed modelling approach in which competing models were compared both based on their fits to behaviour and their ability to recapitulate human electrophysiological signatures of evidence accumulation. Participants made self-paced confidence reports after indicating perceptual choices on a random dot motion task. Model comparison based on behavioural data alone showed that boundary-based stopping rules for confidence reporting provided superior fits than time-based stopping rules. However, results were inconclusive when comparing models with a single evidence accumulation process dictating choice and confidence reports compared to models invoking distinct processes. Importantly, the single-process model markedly outperformed the other models in its ability to account for the observed neural evidence accumulation patterns, including the fact that signal amplitudes predicted reported confidence several hundred milliseconds before the initial choice had been reported. Our study demonstrates that choice behaviour, subjective confidence, and associated neural decision signals can be jointly explained by a model invoking a single process of evidence accumulation with separate boundaries for the initial choice and subsequent confidence reports. Significance StatementHow does the brain generate representations of subjective confidence from categorical decisions? While some models suggest that confidence arises from a read-out of the same information that determined the initial choice, others propose that confidence is determined by a distinct computational process. Definitively testing these alternative accounts has proven difficult because they often make similar predictions for behavioural data. Here, we employ a novel neurally-informed modelling method that evaluates models based on their ability to reproduce key neurophysiological signatures of choice and confidence in addition to behaviour. Our results indicate that choices and subjective confidence are determined by a shared sensory evidence accumulation process.

neuroscience↗

Mind the instructions: reward cues are liked first, wanted later

Current theories propose that mental effort is invested only when the anticipated benefits, such as rewards, outweigh the associated costs, like task difficulty. Yet, it remains unclear whether this motivational and mitigating aspect of reward processing is reflected in the evaluation of reward/difficulty cues as such, and to what extent it depends on task experience. In a pre-registered experiment (N=84), we used the affect misattribution procedure (AMP) to gauge affective evaluations of nonword cues predicting reward and task difficulty levels. Contrary to previous studies, the AMP was administered at the outset, after cue instructions, and after the cues were used in a random dot motion (RDM) task. Compared to baseline, cues predicting a larger reward were evaluated more positively after RDM task experience, and most importantly, already after cue instructions, with no difference between the two phases. This evaluative effect manifested in increased performance after larger reward cues in the RDM task. Our results suggest that AMP effects may generally capture performance expectations which are independent of task experience. Importantly, these instructed expectations of reward and difficulty play a crucial role in the evaluation and subsequent investment of mental effort.

animal behavior and cognition↗

The Temporal Dynamics of Metacognitive Experiences Track Rational Adaptations in Task Performance

Human task performance elicits diverse subjective metacognitive experiences, such as boredom, effort, fatigue and frustration, which are thought to play important roles in the monitoring and regulation of cognitive processes. Yet, their specific contributions to task performance remain poorly understood. Therefore, we investigated the temporal dynamics underlying these metacognitive experiences and the latent cognitive processes supporting task performance. We used a time-on-task design using a conflict Flanker task, and analyzed the data using a comprehensive approach encompassing behavioral, model-based, subjective, and neural measures. Our results show that the temporal dynamics in cognitive processes can be understood as a rational attempt to optimize task performance and that distinct metacognitive experiences track different aspects of this rational endeavor. These findings suggest that metacognitive experiences act as tools for humans to gain insights into the optimality of their cognitive performance.

neuroscience↗

Dynamic influences on static measures of metacognition

Humans differ in their capability to judge the accuracy of their own choices via confidence judgments. Signal detection theory has been used to quantify the extent to which confidence tracks accuracy via M-ratio, often referred to as metacognitive efficiency. This measure, however, is static in that it does not consider the dynamics of decision making. This could be problematic because humans may shift their level of response caution to alter the tradeoff between speed and accuracy. Such shifts could induce unaccounted-for sources of variation in the assessment of metacognition. Instead, evidence accumulation frameworks consider decision making, including the computation of confidence, as a dynamic process unfolding over time. We draw on evidence accumulation frameworks to examine the influence of response caution on metacognition. Simulation results demonstrate that response caution has an influence on M-ratio. We then tested and confirmed that this was also the case in human participants who were explicitly instructed to either focus on speed or accuracy. We next demonstrated that this association between M-ratio and response caution was also present in an experiment without any reference towards speed. The latter finding was replicated in an independent dataset. In contrast, when data were analyzed with a novel dynamic measure of metacognition, which we refer to as v-ratio, in all of the three studies there was no effect of speed-accuracy tradeoff. These findings have important implications for research on metacognition, such as its measurement, domain-generality, individual differences, and neural correlates.

neuroscience↗

Shared Neural Representations of Cognitive Conflict and Negative Affect in the Dorsal Anterior Cingulate Cortex

Influential theories of medial frontal cortex (MFC) function suggest that the MFC registers cognitive conflict as an aversive signal, but no study directly tested this idea. Instead, recent studies suggested that non-overlapping regions in the MFC process conflict and affect. In this pre-registered human fMRI study, we used multivariate pattern analyses to identify which regions respond similarly to conflict and aversive signals. The results reveal that, of all conflict- and value-related regions, the ventral pre-supplementary motor area (or dorsal anterior cingulate cortex) showed a shared neural pattern response to different conflict and affect tasks. These findings challenge recent conclusions that conflict and affect are processed independently, and provide support for integrative views of MFC function.

neuroscience↗