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Usher, M.

Publications and source records attributed to Usher, M..

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Value Certainty in Diffusion Decision Models

The drift-diffusion model (DDM) is widely used and broadly accepted for its ability to account for binary choices (in both the perceptual and preferential domains) and response times (RT), as a function of the stimulus or the choice alternative (or option) values. The DDM is built on an evidence accumulation-to-bound concept, where, in the value domain, a decision maker repeatedly samples the mental representations of the values of the available options until satisfied that there is enough evidence (or support) in favor of one option over the other. As the signals that drive the evidence are derived from value estimates that are not known with certainty, repeated sequential samples are necessary to average out noise. The classic DDM does not allow for different options to have different levels of precision in their value representations. However, recent studies have shown that decision makers often report levels of certainty regarding value estimates that vary across choice options. There is therefore a need to extend the DDM to include an option-specific value certainty component. We present several such DDM extensions and validate them against empirical data from four previous studies. The data support best a DDM version in which the drift of the accumulation is based on a sort of signal-to-noise ratio of value for each option (rather than a mere accumulation of samples from the corresponding value distributions). This DDM variant accounts for the impact of value certainty on both choice consistency and response time present in the empirical data.

neuroscience

Visual attention modulates the integration of goal-relevant evidence and not value

When choosing between options, such as food items presented in plain view, people tend to choose the option they spend longer looking at. The prevailing interpretation is that visual attention increases value. However, in previous studies, value was coupled to a behavioural goal, since subjects had to choose the item they preferred. This makes it impossible to discern if visual attention has an effect on value, or, instead, if attention modulates the information most relevant for the goal of the decision-maker. Here we present the results of two independent studies--a perceptual and a value-based task--that allow us to decouple value from goal-relevant information using specific task-framing. Combining psychophysics with computational modelling, we show that, contrary to the current interpretation, attention does not boost value, but instead it modulates goal-relevant information. This work provides a novel and more general mechanism by which attention interacts with choice.

neuroscience

Choices Change the Temporal Weighting of Decision Evidence

Decisions do not occur in isolation, but are embedded in sequences of other decisions, often pertaining to the same source of evidence. Here, we characterized the impact of intermittent choices on the accumulation of a protracted stream of decision-relevant evidence towards a final decision. Human participants performed two versions, based on perceptual or numerical evidence, of a decision task that required two successive judgments at different times during the evidence stream: an intermittent response consisting of a binary choice, and a continuous estimation at the end of the evidence stream. In a control condition, subjects executed a choice-independent motor response instead of binary choice as the intermittent response. In both, perceptual and numerical tasks, the intermittent choice reduced the sensitivity of subsequent evidence, and flipped the relative temporal weighting of early and late evidence in the final estimation judgment. The individual extent of the choice-induced overall (non-selective) sensitivity reduction predicted the extent of the selective down-weighting of subsequent evidence inconsistent with the initial choice, a form of confirmation bias. In sum, active decisions about a protracted evidence stream profoundly alter the dynamics of evidence accumulation, consistent with an active, modulatory mechanism triggered by the choice.

neuroscience