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Schwartenbeck, P.

Publications and source records attributed to Schwartenbeck, P..

5 recordsLinked to original sources

People with a tobacco use disorder misattribute non-drug cues as worse predictors of positive outcomes compared to drug cues

Adaptive behaviours depend on dynamically updating internal representations of the world based on the ever-changing environmental contingencies. People with a substance use disorder (pSUD) show maladaptive behaviours with high persistence in drug-taking, despite severe negative consequences. We recently proposed a salience misattribution model for addiction (SMMA; Kalhan et al., (2021)), arguing that pSUD have aberrations in their updating processes where drug cues are misattributed as strong predictors of positive outcomes, but weaker predictors of negative outcomes. We also argue that conversely, non-drug cues are misattributed as weak predictors of positive outcomes, but stronger predictors of negative outcomes. However, these hypotheses need to be empirically tested. Here we used a multi-cue reversal learning task, with reversals in whether drug or non-drug cues are currently relevant in predicting the outcome (monetary win or loss). We show that compared to controls, people with a tobacco use disorder (pTUD), do form misaligned internal representations. We found that pTUD updated less towards learning the drug cues relevance in predicting a loss. Further, when neither drug nor non-drug cue predicted a win, pTUD updated more towards the drug cue being relevant predictors of that win. Our Bayesian belief updating model revealed that pTUD had a low estimated likelihood of non-drug cues being predictors of wins, compared to drug cues, which drove the misaligned updating. Overall, several hypotheses of the SMMA were supported, but not all. Our results implicate that strengthening the non-drug cue association with positive outcomes may help restore the misaligned internal representation in pTUD.

neuroscience↗

Generative replay for compositional visual understanding in the prefrontal-hippocampal circuit

Understanding the visual world is a constructive process. Whilst a frontal-hippocampal circuit is known to be essential for this task, little is known about the associated neuronal computations. Visual understanding appears superficially distinct from other known functions of this circuit, such as spatial reasoning and model-based planning, but recent models suggest deeper computational similarities. Here, using fMRI, we show that representations of a simple visual scene in these brain regions are relational and compositional - key computational properties theorised to support rapid construction of hippocampal maps. Using MEG, we show that rapid sequences of representations, akin to replay in spatial navigation and planning problems, are also engaged in visual construction. Whilst these sequences have previously been proposed as mechanisms to plan possible futures or learn from the past, here they are used to understand the present. Replay sequences form constructive hypotheses about possible scene configurations. These hypotheses play out in an optimal order for relational inference, progressing from predictable to uncertain scene elements, gradually constraining possible configurations, and converging on the correct scene configuration. Together, these results suggest a computational bridge between apparently distinct functions of hippocampal-prefrontal circuitry, and a role for generative replay in constructive inference and hypothesis testing.

neuroscience↗

Human belief state-based exploration and exploitation in an information-selective reversal bandit task

Humans often face sequential decision-making problems, in which information about the environmental reward structure is detached from rewards for a subset of actions. In the current exploratory study, we introduce an information-selective symmetric reversal bandit task to model such situations and obtained choice data on this task from 24 participants. To arbitrate between different decision-making strategies that participants may use on this task, we developed a set of probabilistic agent-based behavioral models, including exploitative and explorative Bayesian agents, as well as heuristic control agents. Upon validating the model and parameter recovery properties of our model set and summarizing the participants choice data in a descriptive way, we used a maximum likelihood approach to evaluate the participants choice data from the perspective of our model set. In brief, we provide quantitative evidence that participants employ a belief state-based hybrid explorative-exploitative strategy on the information-selective symmetric reversal bandit task, lending further support to the finding that humans are guided by their subjective uncertainty when solving exploration-exploitation dilemmas.

neuroscience↗

An active inference model of concept learning

Within computational neuroscience, the algorithmic and neural basis of structure learning remains poorly understood. Concept learning is one primary example, which requires both a type of internal model expansion process (adding novel hidden states that explain new observations), and a model reduction process (merging different states into one underlying cause and thus reducing model complexity via meta-learning). Although various algorithmic models of concept learning have been proposed within machine learning and cognitive science, many are limited to various degrees by an inability to generalize, the need for very large amounts of training data, and/or insufficiently established biological plausibility. Using concept learning as an example case, we introduce a novel approach for modeling structure learning - and specifically state-space expansion and reduction - within the active inference framework and its accompanying neural process theory. Our aim is to demonstrate its potential to facilitate a novel line of active inference research in this area. The approach we lay out is based on the idea that a generative model can be equipped with extra (hidden state or cause) slots that can be engaged when an agent learns about novel concepts. This can be combined with a Bayesian model reduction process, in which any concept learning - associated with these slots - can be reset in favor of a simpler model with higher model evidence. We use simulations to illustrate this models ability to add new concepts to its state space (with relatively few observations) and increase the granularity of the concepts it currently possesses. We also simulate the predicted neural basis of these processes. We further show that it can accomplish a simple form of one-shot generalization to new stimuli. Although deliberately simple, these simulation results highlight ways in which active inference could offer useful resources in developing neurocomputational models of structure learning. They provide a template for how future active inference research could apply this approach to real-world structure learning problems and assess the added utility it may offer.

neuroscience↗

Computational mechanisms of curiosity and goal-directed exploration

Successful behaviour depends on the right balance between maximising reward and soliciting information about the world. Here, we show how different types of information-gain emerge when casting behaviour as surprise minimisation. We present two distinct mechanisms for goal-directed exploration that express separable profiles of active sampling to reduce uncertainty. Hidden state exploration motivates agents to sample unambiguous observations to accurately infer the (hidden) state of the world. Conversely, model parameter exploration, compels agents to sample outcomes associated with high uncertainty, if they are informative for their representation of the task structure. We illustrate the emergence of these types of information-gain, termed active inference and active learning, and show how these forms of exploration induce distinct patterns of Bayes-optimal behaviour. Our findings provide a computational framework to understand how distinct levels of uncertainty induce different modes of information-gain in decision-making.

neuroscience↗