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Schultze, T.

Publications and source records attributed to Schultze, T..

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Distinct neural routes for evaluative and informational social influence

Humans routinely revise their judgments based on input from others, yet how the brain mechanisms distinguish evaluative from informational social influence remains unclear. Using preregistered electroencephalography (EEG, N = 87) and the Judge-Advisor System, we identified distinct neurocognitive routes by which feedback and advice shape judgment revision. Participants made numerical estimates, received either feedback ("good"/"bad") or advice (alternative estimates) of varying proximity to their own judgment, and then revised their response. Feedback engaged rapid evaluative monitoring: a feedback-related negativity (FRN, 200-300ms) that decreased with confidence, indicating reflexive performance assessment. Advice triggered delayed deliberate processing: late positive complex (LPC) onset latencies that slowed when confident individuals encountered discrepant advice, indicating effortful integration of external information. Both routes converged on the P300 (250-250ms),whose amplitudes increased with proximity, consistent with the reward value of social validation. These findings reveal a dual-route architecture: feedback determines whether to revise through rapid evaluative signals, while advice specifies how much to revise through sustained integrative processes. Confidence calibrates both routes, protecting against misleading feedback while intensifying deliberation over discrepant advice. This temporal dissociation clarifies how metacognitive and social processes coordinate adaptive judgment revision.

neuroscience↗

Emergence and suppression of cooperation by action visibility in transparent games

Real-world agents, such as humans, animals and robots, observe each other during interactions and choose their own actions taking the partners ongoing behaviour into account. Yet, classical game theory assumes that players act either strictly sequentially or strictly simultaneously (without knowing the choices of each other). To account for action visibility and provide a more realistic model of interactions under time constraints, we introduce a new game-theoretic setting called transparent game, where each player has a certain probability to observe the choice of the partner before deciding on its own action. Using evolutionary simulations, we demonstrate that even a small probability of seeing the partners choice before ones own decision substantially changes evolutionary successful strategies. Action visibility enhances cooperation in a Bach-or-Stravinsky game, but disrupts cooperation in a more competitive iterated Prisoners Dilemma. In both games, strategies based on the "Win-stay, lose-shift" and "Tit-for-tat" principles are predominant for moderate transparency, while for high transparency strategies of "Leader-Follower" type emerge. Our results have implications for studies of human and animal social behaviour, especially for the analysis of dyadic and group interactions.

evolutionary biology↗