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Biology subjects

Richard McElreath

Publications and source records attributed to Richard McElreath.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

The coevolutionary romance of social learning and parasitic behavior

Once an animal begins to acquire behavior by social learning, it may be seduced by parasitic parasitic, behavior that reduces the animals fitness and thereby increases its own spread. However, the animals psychology will coevolve, potentially limiting the influence and spread of parasitic behavior. I revisit prominent models of the evolution of social learning and introduce the possibility of parasitic behavior. First, I explore a courtship between primitive social learning and parasitic behavior. Parasitic behavior can spread, but selection on the host then reduces social learning and limits its importance. Both parties are frustrated. In the second part, I study a reconciliation dynamic in which social learning becomes strategic about who it partners with. In this model, parasitic behavior can become prevalent and substantially reduce host fitness. However, it may also evolve to be mutualistic and raise the mean fitness of the host organism. When this occurs, natural selection may favor psychological susceptibility to parasitic behavior. Both social learning and socially learned behavior can enjoy a happy ending.

Evolutionary Biology

Strategic Social Learning and the Population Dynamics of Human Behavior: The Game of Go

Human culture is widely believed to undergo evolution, via mechanisms rooted in the nature of human cognition. A number of theories predict the kinds of human learning strategies, as well as the population dynamics that result from their action. There is little work, however, that quantitatively examines the evidence for these strategies and resulting cultural evolution within human populations. One of the obstacles is the lack of individual-level data with which to link transmission events to larger cultural dynamics. Here, we address this problem with a rich quantitative database from the East Asian board game known as Go. We draw from a large archive of Go games spanning the last six decades of professional play, and find evidence that the evolutionary dynamics of particular cultural variants are driven by a mix of individual and social learning processes. Particular players vary dramatically in their sensitivity to population knowledge, which also varies by age and nationality. The dynamic patterns of opening Go moves are consistent with an ancient, ongoing arms race within the game itself.

Evolutionary Biology