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Reid, S. M.

Publications and source records attributed to Reid, S. M..

13 recordsLinked to original sources

Revolutionising notifiable avian disease diagnostics: validation of direct swab testing for Avian Influenza and Newcastle disease using the CENOS platform

Existing molecular diagnostic approaches for notifiable avian diseases (NADs) involve a suite of PCR assays that enable both generic detection, and where positive, subtyping of both avian influenza virus (AIV) and Newcastle disease virus (NDV). Novel rapid and direct diagnostic assays for the detection of AIV and NDV were developed and evaluated using unprocessed cloacal (C) and oropharyngeal (OP) poultry swab material. Both assays employ a closed tube direct real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RRT-PCR) approach in which viral lysis is achieved by heat treatment and a dedicated PCR compatible buffer, followed by detection using a RRT-PCR approach. Primer and probe sets were designed using globally circulating AIV and NDV sequences collected over the preceding five years, rather than region-specific sequence datasets, so that the assays detect all circulating genotypes. Analytical performance assessment demonstrated that both assays were highly sensitive and specific, successfully detecting all unextracted target antigens without cross reactivity to a panel of other common poultry pathogens. For each assay, viral lysis and amplification were achieved directly from samples at single digit genome copy numbers. Furthermore, low levels of viral RNA could be reliably detected in the presence of C and OP matrix material, providing proof-of-concept for direct detection of these economically significant avian pathogens in a field setting. Additional use case scenarios, including pooled sample screening and combined C/OP testing from individual birds, were also explored. These findings establish a foundation for ongoing studies incorporating paired-sample testing against validated laboratory reference assays.

molecular biology↗

Infection of ratites with clade 2.3.4.4b HPAIV H5N1: Potential implications for zoonotic risk

We detected H5N1 high pathogenicity avian influenza in captive Greater Rhea (Rhea americana). Viral genetic analysis revealed the mammalian associated PB2-E627K mutation, indicating selection of mammalian-relevant mutations in ratites. Pathologic investigation of available tissues demonstrated severe multifocal necrotising inflammation, and a strong vasculotropism.

pathology↗

Co-circulation of distinct high pathogenicity avian influenza virus (HPAIV) subtypes in a mass mortality event in wild seabirds and co-location with dead seals

H5Nx clade 2.3.4.4b high pathogenicity avian influenza viruses (HPAIV) have been detected repeatedly in Great Britain (GB) since autumn 2020, with H5N1 dominating detections but with low level detection of H5N5 during 2025. Globally, these viruses have caused mass mortalities in captive and wild avian and mammalian populations, including terrestrial and marine mammals. H5N1 has been the dominant subtype, and whilst incursions have overlapped temporally, occurrences have often been spatially distinct. Here, we report the detection of a mortality event in wild birds on the Norfolk coastline in the east of England, where H5N1 HPAIV was detected in five Great Black-backed Gulls (Larus marinus) and a Northern Fulmar (Fulmarus glacialis). Interestingly, at the same site, and as part of the same mortality event, a total of 17 Great Black-backed Gulls, one Herring Gull (Larus argentatus), one Atlantic Puffin (Fratercula arctica) and one Northern Fulmar tested positive for H5N5 HPAIV. Additionally, H5N5 was also detected in 17 co-located Grey Seal carcases (Halichoerus grypus). The H5N1 HPAIV from an infected bird belonged to genotype DI.2, closely related to contemporaneous detections in GB wild birds and poultry. In contrast, all H5N5 HPAIVs from birds and seals were genotype I with a 22-amino acid stalk deletion in NA and the 627K polymorphism in PB2. This represents the first recorded instance in GB of two subtypes being detected within the same avian population at the same location. It is also the first mass detection of HPAIV H5N5 in mammals within GB. Potential infection mechanisms are discussed.

genetics↗

Detection of clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 high pathogenicity avian influenza virus in a sheep in Great Britain, 2025

Clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 high pathogenicity avian influenza virus (HPAIV) continues to pose a significant global threat, affecting wild and domestic avian populations, and mammalian species. In early 2024, H5N1 HPAIV was detected in dairy cattle in the United States of America, where it has continued to circulate, with sporadic detections also reported in other ruminant species. The detection of high viral loads in milk from infected cattle, has resulted in several human infections, underscoring the zoonotic potential of these viruses. In response, several countries have intensified surveillance in non-avian species to evaluate the potential for undetected viral circulation in captive mammals. In Great Britain, bulk milk tank testing of cattle and targeted surveillance of captive mammalian species on an infected premises is undertaken in accordance with the outcome of a rapid risk assessment undertaken to determine the epidemiological links between the poultry and captive mammals. A result of this testing was the first recorded detection of clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIV in a sheep in March 2025, identified on an infected poultry premises in Great Britain. An initial seropositive result in a single ewe triggered further investigation, confirming serological positivity across repeated sampling and the presence of viral RNA in milk samples. This detection was confined to a single animal and was likely attributable to proximity to infected poultry and a presumed heavily contaminated environment. The implications of this ruminant detection are discussed in the context of interspecies transmission and surveillance strategies.

microbiology↗

Diverse Genomic Landscape of Swine Influenza A Virus in England (2014 - 2021)

Surveillance of influenza A viruses in pigs (SwIAV) is critical for identification of novel genetic groups that pose a risk to pig health and might have zoonotic potential. SwIAVs circulating in pigs in England between 2014 and 2021 were characterised using whole genome sequencing (WGS). Haemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) sequencing data from 82 of 368 influenza A positive samples (71 submissions) were determined, identifying H1N1 and H1N2 subtypes from the 1A classical swine and 1B human-seasonal lineages respectively. The 1B lineage viruses were predominant, accounting for 68.29% of sequenced viruses, with 1A lineage viruses comprising 31.71%, primarily from the 1A.3.3.2 clade (2009 H1N1 pandemic origin). This study characterised previously undefined diversity within the 1B lineage which led to the designation of new HA clades 1B.1.1.1, 1B.1.1.2 and 1B.1.1.3. Complete genome data were obtained from 64/82 viruses thereby updating the definition of genetic diversity thresholds and leading to the identification of 24 unique genotypes. All these 64 viruses contained PB2, PB1, PA, NP, MP, and NS gene segments of 2009 H1N1 pandemic origin. These data highlight the increasing divergence of SwIAV within pig populations England and emphasise the requirement for continued genomic surveillance to improve animal health and monitor zoonotic risk.

genomics↗

Asymptomatic infection and antibody prevalence to co-occurring avian influenza viruses vary substantially between sympatric seabird species following H5N1 outbreaks

Emerging infectious diseases are of major concern to animal and human health. Recent emergence of high pathogenicity avian influenza virus (HPAIV) (H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b) led to substantial global mortality across a range of host species. Co-occurring species showed marked differences in mortality, generating an urgent need for better epidemiological understanding within affected populations. We therefore tested for antibodies, indicative of previous exposure and recovery, and for active viral infection in apparently healthy individuals (n=350) across five co-occurring seabird species on the Isle of May, Scotland, during 2023, following H5N1 HPAIV associated mortality in the preceding summer. Antibody prevalence to AIV subtypes varied substantially between species, ranging from 1.1% in European shags (Gulosus aristotelis) (to H5) to 78.7% in black-legged kittiwakes (Rissa tridactyla) (to H16 or both H13 and H16), and between 31-41% for three auk species (H5, H16 or both). At least 20.4% of auks had antibodies to an as yet unidentified subtype, suggesting further subtypes circulating in the population. We found low levels of active, but asymptomatic, AIV infection in individuals (1.6-4.5%), but excluded this as H5N1. Our results emphasise the importance of testing healthy individuals to understand the prevalence of co-circulating AIV subtypes in wild populations, and the potential for future reassortment events which could alter virus behaviour and impact.

ecology↗

Validation of Optimized Methods for Avian Influenza Virus Isolation in Specific Pathogen-Free Embryonated Fowl Eggs

The internationally recognised method for diagnosis of avian influenza (AI) is virus isolation (VI) in specific pathogen-free embryonated fowls eggs (EFEs). In Great Britain (GB), AI virus isolation currently involves two passages in EFEs; the first typically of two days duration followed by a second lasting up to four days meaning that premises may remain under restriction for up to six days. Shorter time lengths for AIV isolation were investigated to reduce the time that businesses remain under official restrictions to safely negate AI infection, whilst maintaining test sensitivity. Both experimental inoculations of EFEs and analyses of VI attempts from high pathogenicity (HP) AI disease incursions in GB since 2016 demonstrated that HP viruses were isolated during first passage while for low pathogenicity AI outbreaks, the second passage could be reduced to two days. Power analysis showed that the benefit of reducing the number of days outweighed the risk of missing a positive isolate. This approach will substantially reduce costs to government and industry by releasing restrictions at least two days earlier where samples are negative for viral nucleic acid. Critically, it will reduce welfare implications of housing birds under restriction and improve international standards without loss of test performance.

microbiology↗

Detection and spread of high pathogenicity avian influenza virus H5N1 in the Antarctic Region

Until recent events, the Antarctic was the only major geographical region in which high pathogenicity avian influenza virus (HPAIV) had never previously been detected. The current panzootic of H5N1 HPAIV has decimated wild bird populations across Europe, North America, and South America. Here we report on the detection of clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIV in the Antarctic and sub-Antarctic regions of South Georgia and the Falkland Islands, respectively. We initially detected H5N1 HPAIV in samples collected from brown skuas at Bird Island, South Georgia on 8th October 2023. Since this detection, mortalities were observed in brown skuas, kelp gulls, South Georgia shag, Antarctic tern, elephant seals and fur seals at multiple sites across South Georgia. Subsequent testing confirmed H5N1 HPAIV across several sampling locations in multiple avian species and two seal species. Simultaneously, we also confirmed H5N1 HPAIV in southern fulmar and black-browed albatross in the Falkland Islands. Genetic assessment of the virus indicates spread from South America, likely through movement of migratory birds. Critically, genetic assessment of sequences from mammalian species demonstrates no increased risk to human populations. Here we describe the detection, species impact and genetic composition of the virus and propose both introductory routes and potential long-term impact on avian and mammalian species across the Antarctic region. We also speculate on the threat to specific populations following recent reports in the area.

microbiology↗

The role of airborne particles in the epidemiology of clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 high pathogenicity avian influenza virus in commercial poultry production units

Since October 2021, Europe has experienced the largest avian influenza virus (AIV) epizootic, caused by clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 high pathogenicity AIV (HPAIV), with over 320 poultry and captive bird infected premises (IPs) and 2480 dead H5N1 positive wild birds detected in Great Britain alone. Many IPs have been detected as geographical clusters, raising questions around potential lateral spread between premises by airborne particles. Airborne transmission over short distances has been reported for some AIVs strains. However, the risk of airborne spread of this strain remains to be elucidated. We conducted extensive sampling from IPs where clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIVs was confirmed during the 2022/23 epizootic, each representing a major poultry species (ducks, turkeys, and chickens). A range of environmental samples were collected inside and outside houses, including deposited dust, feathers, and other potential fomites. Viral RNA (vRNA) and infectious virus were detected in air samples collected from inside and outside, but in close proximity, of infected houses, with vRNA alone being detected greater distances (>10m) outside. Some dust samples collected outside of the affected houses contained infectious virus, while feathers from the affected houses, located up to 60m away, only contained vRNA. Together, these data suggest that airborne particles harbouring infectious HPAIV can be translocated short distances (<10m) through the air, while particles containing vRNA might travel further (<50m). Therefore, the potential for airborne transmission of clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIV between premises is considered low. Other factors, including indirect contact with wild birds, fomite spread and the efficiency of biosecurity represent greater importance in disease incursion. IMPORTANCEUnderstanding the routes of avian influenza virus incursion into poultry premises is critical to ensure the implementation of effective preventative measures, reducing the risk of spread of the virus. Extensive environmental sampling across three infected premises, representing the major global commercial poultry species, detected viral RNA and infectious virus in air samples, dust, and other fomites inside of the houses containing infected poultry, as well as within the immediate proximity of infected houses. This suggests that particles harbouring infectious virus may travel short distances outside of affected houses, which may potentially contribute to house-to-house transmission on the same premises, but not at distances likely to contribute to the transmission to another poultry premises. Consequently, control efforts should be focused on traditional, robust biosecurity measures at key barriers on poultry houses. Human behaviour in and around poultry houses as factors contributing to biosecurity risks should be considered.

microbiology↗

Pathology of naturally acquired high pathogenicity avian influenza virus H5N1 infection in seabirds

The re-emergence of the high pathogenicity avian influenza virus (HPAIV) subtype H5N1 in the United Kingdom in 2021-2022 has caused unprecedented epizootic events in wild birds and poultry. During the summer of 2022 there was a shift in virus transmission dynamics resulting in increased HPAIV infection in seabirds and consequently a profound impact on seabird populations. To understand the pathological impact of HPAIV in seabirds, we have evaluated the virus distribution and associated pathological changes in the tissues of great skua (Stercorarius skua, n=8), long tailed skua (Stercorarius longicaudus, n=1), European herring gull (Larus argentatus, n=5), and black-headed gull (Chroicocephalus ridibundus, n=4). Grossly there was gizzard ulceration in one great skua and pancreatic necrosis in four herring gulls, which were confirmed for virus infection in situ by immunohistochemistry. Microscopical analysis revealed neuro-, pneumo-, lymphoidand cardiotropism of HPAIV H5N1, with the most common virus-associated pathological changes being pancreatic and splenic necrosis. Examination of the reproductive tract of the great skua revealed HPAIV-associated oophoritis and salpingitis, and virus replication within the oviductal epithelium. Across the birds, epitheliotropism was evident in the intestine, nasal turbinate, and trachea. This was, in contrast, not observed in the 2021 summer mortality event in great skuas and may be significant for the disease epidemiology observed in 2022. The emergence of HPAIV in seabirds, particularly during summer 2022, has challenged the dogma of HPAIV dynamics, posing a significant threat to wild bird life with potential implications to the reproductive performance of seabirds of conservation importance.

pathology↗

Investigating the genetic diversity of H5 avian influenza in the UK 2020-2022

Since 2020, the UK and Europe, have experienced annual epizootics of high pathogenicity avian influenza virus (HPAIV). The first during autumn/winter 2020/21 involved the detected with six H5Nx subtypes although H5N8 HPAIV dominated in the UK. Whilst genetic assessment of the H5N8 HPAIVs within the UK demonstrated relative homogeneity, there was a background of other genotypes circulating at a lower degree with different neuraminidase and internal genes. Following a small number of summer detections of H5N1 in wild birds over the summer of 2021, autumn/winter 2021/22 saw another European H5 HPAIV epizootic, that has dwarfed the prior epizootic. This second epizootic was dominated almost exclusively by H5N1 HPAIV, although six distinct genotypes were defined. We have used genetic analysis to evaluate the emergence of different genotypes and proposed reassortment events that have been observed. The existing data suggests that the H5N1 circulating in Europe during late 2020, continued to circulate in wild birds throughout 2021, with minimal adaptation, but has then gone on to reassort with AIVs in the wild bird population. We have undertaken an in-depth genetic assessment of H5 HPAIVs detected in the UK, over the last two winter seasons and demonstrate the utility of in-depth genetic analyses in defining the diversity of H5 HPAIVs circulating in avian species, the potential for zoonotic risk and whether incidents of lateral spread can be defined over independent incursion of infection from wild birds. Key supporting data for mitigation activities. ImportanceHigh pathogenicity avian influenza virus (HPAIV) outbreaks devastate avian species across all sectors having both economic and ecological impacts through mortalities in poultry and wild birds, respectively. These viruses can also represent a significant zoonotic risk. Since 2020, the UK has experienced two successive outbreaks of H5 HPAIV. Whilst H5N8 HPAIV was predominant during the 2020/21 outbreak, other H5 subtypes were also detected. The following year there was a shift in subtype dominance to H5N1 HPAIV, but multiple H5N1 genotypes were detected. Through thorough utilisation of whole-genome sequencing, it was possible to track and characterise the genetic evolution of these H5 HPAIVs in UK poultry and wild birds. This has enabled us to assess the risk posed by these viruses at the poultry:wild bird and the avian:human interface and to investigate potential lateral spread between infected premises, a key factor in understanding threat to the commercial sector.

molecular biology↗

Systemic infection with highly pathogenic H5N8 of avian origin produces encephalitis and mortality in wild mammals at a UK rehabilitation centre

Europe has experienced extensive outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) during the autumn/winter 2020/21 season. These avian influenza A viruses are highly transmissible and have infected over 1000 commercial and backyard poultry premises in Europe in this period causing high mortality. The impact on wild bird populations has also been significant, with over 400 detections in at least 47 different species reported across Europe as being positive with the H5N8 virus. Although different H5Nx combinations within the H5 clade 2.3.4.4b have been detected, the H5N8 subtype has predominated both in wild birds and domestic poultry outbreaks. In the UK there have been 22 outbreaks of H5N8 in domestic poultry and captive birds and more than 300 wild bird detections involving H5N8 over the autumn/winter 2020/21 period to April 2021. Here we detail the series of events surrounding the detection of an H5N8 influenza A virus of avian origin in five swans, a fox and three seals in a wildlife rehabilitation centre.

microbiology↗

Avian influenza virus (A/H3N8) with a putative mammalian-adaptive mutation found in a stranded grey seal pup (Halichoerus grypus) rescued on the Cornwall coast, UK

Avian Influenza A Viruses (IAV) in different species of seals display a spectrum of pathogenicity, from subclinical infection to mass mortality events. Here we present an investigation of avian IAV infection in a 3-4 month old Grey seal (Halichoerus grypus) pup, rescued from St Michaels Mount, Cornwall in 2017. The pup underwent medical treatment but died after two weeks; post-mortem examination and histology indicated sepsis as the cause of death. IAV NP antigen was detected by immunohistochemistry in the nasal mucosa, and sensitive real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction assays detected trace amounts of viral RNA within the lower respiratory tract, suggesting that the infection may have been cleared naturally. IAV prevalence among Grey seals may therefore be underestimated. Moreover, contact with humans during the rescue raised concerns about potential zoonotic risk. Nucleotide sequencing revealed the virus to be of subtype H3N8. Combining a GISAID database BLAST search and time-scaled phylogenetic analyses, we inferred that the seal virus originated from an unsampled, locally circulating (in Northern Europe) viruses, likely from wild Anseriformes. From examining the protein alignments, we found several residue changes in the seal virus that did not occur in the bird viruses, including D701N in the PB2 segment, a rare mutation, and a hallmark of mammalian adaptation of bird viruses. IAVs of H3N8 subtype have been noted for their particular ability to cross the species barrier and cause productive infections, including historical records suggesting that they may have caused the 1889 pandemic. Therefore, infections such as the one we report here may be of interest to pandemic surveillance and risk and may help us better understand the determinants and drivers of mammalian adaptation in influenza.

microbiology↗