bioRxiv ScienceSearch

Biology subjects

Paarporn, K.

Publications and source records attributed to Paarporn, K..

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Systematic biases in disease forecasting - the role of behavior change

In a simple susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) model, the initial speed at which infected cases increase is indicative of the long-term trajectory of the outbreak. Yet during real-world outbreaks, individuals may modify their behavior and take preventative steps to reduce infection risk. As a consequence, the relationship between the initial rate of spread and the final case count may become tenuous. Here, we evaluate this hypothesis by comparing the dynamics arising from a simple SIR epidemic model with those from a modified SIR model in which individuals reduce contacts as a function of the current or cumulative number of cases. Dynamics with behavior change exhibit significantly reduced final case counts even though the initial speed of disease spread is nearly identical for both of the models. We show that this difference in final size projections depends critically in the behavior change of individuals. These results also provide a rationale for integrating behavior change into iterative forecast models. Hence, we propose to use a Kalman filter to update models with and without behavior change as part of iterative forecasts. When the ground truth outbreak includes behavior change, sequential predictions using a simple SIR model perform poorly despite repeated observations while predictions using the modified SIR model are able to correct for initial forecast errors. These findings highlight the value of incorporating behavior change into baseline epidemic and dynamic forecast models.

epidemiology

Information sharing for a coordination game in fluctuating environments

Collective action dilemmas pervade the social and biological sciences - from human decision-making to bacterial quorum sensing. In these scenarios, individuals sense cues from the environment to adopt a suitable phenotype or change in behavior. However, when cues include signals from other individuals, then the appropriate behavior of each individual is linked. Here, we develop a framework to quantify the influence of information sharing on individual behavior in the context of two player coordination games. In this framework, the environment stochastically switches between two states, and the state determines which one of two actions players must coordinate on. Given a stochastically switching environment, we then consider two versions of the game that differ in the way players acquire information. In the first model, players independently sense private environmental cues, but do not communicate with each other. We find there are two types of strategies that emerge as Nash equilibria and fitness maximizers - players prefer to commit to one particular action when private information is poor, or prefer to employ phenotypic plasticity when it is good. The second model adds an additional layer of communication, where players share social cues as well. When the quality of social information is high, we find the socially optimal strategy is a novel \"majority logic\" strategy that bases decision-making on social cues. Our game-theoretic approach offers a principled way of investigating the role of communication in group decision-making under uncertain conditions.

animal behavior and cognition