Biology subjects

Muthukrishna, M.

Publications and source records attributed to Muthukrishna, M..

5 recordsLinked to original sources

bioRxiv2024

Coleoid Cephalopods Demonstrate Asocial Path to the Evolution of Big Brains

Social factors have been argued to be the main selection pressure for the evolution of large brains and complex behavior on the basis of data from mammals and birds. Coleoid cephalopods (octopuses, squid, and cuttlefish) have large brains, complex nervous systems and show signs of intelligent behavior comparable to that of primates, cetaceans, and birds. However, many cephalopods live largely solitary, semelparous, short lives, and many are cannibalistic, leaving little to no opportunity for parental care, complex group dynamics, or social learning. This suggests that the large brains found in cephalopods are not the result of social selection pressures. Here, motivated by the predictions of the "Asocial Brain Hypothesis", a yet untested regime of the Cultural Brain Hypothesis formal model, we compare the relationships between brain size and social, ecological, and other factors in cephalopods. Consistent with the prediction that ecological factors should be the primary selection pressure with larger brains in more calorie-rich complex ecologies, we find that shallower and benthic (seafloor) habitats--arguably more complex environments than open-ocean (pelagic) habitats--are associated with larger brain sizes, and that measures of sociality are not. Our findings from these highly divergent evolutionary lineages, which diverged from vertebrates over 500 million years ago are not causal, but are consistent with the "Asocial Brain Hypothesis" mechanistic model that describes how ecological selection pressures can also produce large, complex brains.

evolutionary biology↗

bioRxiv2023

Indirect Reciprocity Undermines Indirect Reciprocity Destabilizing Large-Scale Cooperation

Previous models suggest that indirect reciprocity (reputation) can stabilize large-scale human cooperation1. The logic behind these models2-7 and experiments6,8 is that a strategy in which individuals conditionally aid others based on their reputation for engaging in costly cooperative behavior serves as a punishment that incentivizes large-scale cooperation without the second-order free-rider problem. However, these models and experiments fail to account for individuals belonging to multiple groups with reputations that can be in conflict. Here we extend these models such that individuals belong to a smaller, "local" group embedded within a larger, "global" group. This introduces competing strategies for conditionally aiding others based on their cooperative behavior in the local or global group. Our analyses reveal that the reputation for cooperation in the smaller local group can undermine cooperation in the larger global group, even when the theoretical maximum payoffs are higher in the larger global group. This model reveals that indirect reciprocity alone is insufficient for stabilizing large-scale human cooperation because cooperation at one scale can be considered defection at another. These results deepen the puzzle of large-scale human cooperation.

evolutionary biology↗

bioRxiv2021

The Size of the Stag Determines the Level of Cooperation

Human societies have expanded from small bands to large nation-states over the past 12,000 years. Yet, how groups scale up cooperation and why cooperation varies widely between societies, remains a central puzzle. We present a theoretical model that addresses these puzzles by extending the classic Stag Hunt game to (a) multiple players, (b) multiple rewards ("stags") of different sizes, and (c) endogenous population growth. This framework reveals a "cooperation ladder" where each rung corresponds to a reward that requires a threshold number of cooperators. As cooperation increases, larger rewards become attainable. Securing a larger reward raises carrying capacity (e.g. by providing more food or energy), enabling subsequent population growth and unlocking the possibility of further cooperative gains. However, between these thresholds, cooperation can stagnate or reverse, effectively incentivizing free-riders at intermediate levels. We show that history matters. Early cooperation and population growth can set groups on divergent, path-dependent trajectories. Our model predicts multiple stable equilibria, with surges in cooperation when a new threshold is within reach, and stalls when higher rewards seem unattainable. This framework helps explain key patterns including why cooperation can sometimes accelerate rapidly, why some societies get stuck at smaller scales, and how seemingly selfish behavior can persist in cooperative groups. Expanding the scale of cooperation may depend on how incentives correspond to both environmental conditions, existing levels of cooperation, and population dynamics, offering a new lens on historical transitions in social complexity and insights for modern coordination challenges such as climate change. Significance StatementSmall groups can sometimes grow into large-scale cooperative societies, while other societies stagnate at smaller scales. Our theoretical model reveals that population growth and cooperative thresholds for accessing resources or energy create a "cooperation ladder." As a groups population increases, new larger-scale payoffs become attainable, which in turn fuels further growth. However, between these critical thresholds, cooperation tends to stall and some free-riding is tolerated. This mechanism offers a new explanation for historical bursts in population and cooperation (such as the agricultural and Industrial revolutions), why some societies remain small, and how selfish behavior can persist in cooperative groups. It also provides insights into global coordination challenges like climate change by highlighting the material conditions needed to sustain and expand large-scale cooperation.

evolutionary biology↗

bioRxiv2020

Cultural Evolution of Genetic Heritability

Behavioral genetics and cultural evolution have both revolutionized our understanding of human behavior, but largely independently of each other. Here we reconcile these two fields using a dual inheritance approach, which offers a more nuanced understanding of the interaction between genes and culture, and a resolution to several long-standing puzzles. For example, by neglecting how human environments are extensively shaped by cultural dynamics, behavioral genetic approaches systematically inflate heritability estimates and thereby overestimate the genetic basis of human behavior. A WEIRD (Western, educated, industrialized, rich, democratic) gene problem obscures this inflation. Considering both genetic and cultural evolutionary forces, heritability scores become less a property of a trait and more a moving target that responds to cultural and social changes. Ignoring cultural evolutionary forces leads to an over-simplified model of gene-to-phenotype causality. When cumulative culture functionally overlaps with genes, genetic effects become masked, or even reversed, and the causal effect of an identified gene is confounded with features of the cultural environment, specific to a particular society at a particular time. This framework helps explain why it is easier to discover genes for deficiencies than genes for abilities. With this framework, we predict the ways in which heritability should differ between societies, between socioeconomic levels within some societies but not others, and over the life course. An integrated cultural evolutionary behavioral genetics cuts through the nature-nurture debate and elucidates controversial topics such as general intelligence.

genetics↗

bioRxiv2017

The Cultural Brain Hypothesis: How culture drives brain expansion, underlies sociality, and alters life history

In the last few million years, the hominin brain more than tripled in size. Comparisons across evolutionary lineages suggest that this expansion may be part of a broader trend toward larger, more complex brains in many taxa. Efforts to understand the evolutionary forces driving brain expansion have focused on climatic, ecological, and social factors. Here, building on existing research on learning, we analytically and computationally model the predictions of two closely related hypotheses: The Cultural Brain Hypothesis and the Cumulative Cultural Brain Hypothesis. The Cultural Brain Hypothesis posits that brains have been selected for their ability to store and manage information, acquired through asocial or social learning. The model of the Cultural Brain Hypothesis reveals relationships between brain size, group size, innovation, social learning, mating structures, and the length of the juvenile period that are supported by the existing empirical literature. From this model, we derive a set of predictions--the Cumulative Cultural Brain Hypothesis--for the conditions that favor an autocatalytic take-off characteristic of human evolution. This narrow evolutionary pathway, created by cumulative cultural evolution, may help explain the rapid expansion of human brains and other aspects of our species life history and psychology.

evolutionary biology↗