Biology subjects

McElreath, R.

Publications and source records attributed to McElreath, R..

5 recordsLinked to original sources

bioRxiv2018

Rapid environmental change in games: complications and curiosities

Human-induced rapid environmental change (HIREC) has recently led to alterations in the fitness and behavior of many organisms. Game theory is an important tool of behavioral ecology for analyzing evolutionary situations involving multiple individuals. However, game theory bypasses the details by which behavioral phenotypes are determined, taking the functional perspective straight from expected payoffs to predicted frequencies of behaviors. In contrast with optimization approaches, we identify that to use existing game theoretic models to predict HIREC effects, additional mechanistic details (or assumptions) will often be required. We illustrate this in relation to the hawk-dove game by showing that three different mechanisms, each of which support the same ESS prior to HIREC (fixed polymorphism, probabilistic choice, or cue dependency), can have a substantial effect on behavior (and success) following HIREC. Surprisingly, an increase in the value of resources can lead to a reduction in payoffs (and vice versa), both in the immediate- and long-term following HIREC. An increase in expected costs also increases expected payoffs. Along with these counter-intuitive findings, this work shows that simply understanding the behavioral payoffs of existing games is insufficient to make predictions about the effects of HIREC.\n\nIts the little details that are vital. Little things make big things happen.\n\nJohn Wooden

animal behavior and cognition↗

bioRxiv2017

Complex Dynamics From Simple Cognition: The Primary Ratchet Effect In Animal Culture

AO_SCPLOWBSTRACTC_SCPLOWIt is often observed that human culture, unlike most other animal culture, is cumulative: human technology and behavior is more complex than any individual could invent in their own lifetime. Cumulative culture is often explained by appeal to a combination of high-fidelity social learning and innovation, the \"ratchet effect.\" What is often overlooked is that both human and other animal culture is supported by a more primary ratchet effect that retains and increases the prevalence of adaptive behavior. This primary ratchet can arise without appeal to specialized cognitive adaptations and is plausibly more widespread in animal societies. We use a simple model to highlight how simple forms of contingent social learning can create the primary ratchet effect, dramatically increasing the prevalence of adaptive, hard to invent behavior. We investigate some ways that demography may interact with the primary ratchet to generate patterns of cultural variation. As the primary ratchet may be common to many animal societies, its cognitive components and population dynamics provide a common foundation for the study of animal culture and a necessary foundation for understanding the origins of human cumulative culture.

animal behavior and cognition↗

bioRxiv2017

The Evolution Of Covert Signaling

Human sociality depends upon the benefits of mutual aid and extensive communication. However, diverse norms and preferences complicate mutual aid, and ambiguity in meaning hinders communication. Here we demonstrate that these two problems can work together to enhance cooperation through the strategic use of deliberately ambiguous signals: covert signaling. Covert signaling is the transmission of information that is accurately received by its intended audience but obscured when perceived by others. Such signals may allow coordination and enhanced cooperation while also avoiding the alienation or hostile reactions of individuals with different preferences. Although the empirical literature has identified potential mechanisms of covert signaling, such as encryption in humor, there is to date no formal theory of its dynamics. We introduce a novel mathematical model to assess when a covert signaling strategy will evolve, as well as how receiver attitudes coevolve with covert signals. Covert signaling plausibly serves an important function in facilitating within-group cooperative assortment by allowing individuals to pair up with similar group members when possible and to get along with dissimilar ones when necessary. This mechanism has broad implications for theories of signaling and cooperation, humor, social identity, political psychology, and the evolution of human cultural complexity.

evolutionary biology↗

bioRxiv2017

Payoff-biased social learning underlies the diffusion of novel extractive foraging traditions in a wild primate

AO_SCPLOWBSTRACTC_SCPLOWThe type and variety of learning strategies used by individuals to acquire behaviours in the wild are poorly understood, despite the presence of behavioural traditions in diverse taxa. Social learning strategies such as conformity can be broadly adaptive, but may also retard the spread of adaptive innovations. Strategies like payoff-biased learning, in contrast, are effective at diffusing new behaviour but may perform poorly when adaptive behaviour is common. We present a field experiment in a wild primate, Cebus capucinus, that introduced a novel food item and documented the innovation and diffusion of successful extraction techniques. We develop a multilevel, Bayesian statistical analysis that allows us to quantify individual-level evidence for different social and individual learning strategies. We find that payoff-biased social learning and age-biased social learning are primarily responsible for the diffusion of new techniques. We find no evidence of conformity; instead rare techniques receive slightly increased attention. We also find substantial and important variation in individual learning strategies that is patterned by age, with younger individuals being more influenced by both social information and their own individual experience. The aggregate cultural dynamics in turn depend upon the variation in learning strategies and the age structure of the wild population.

animal behavior and cognition↗

bioRxiv2016

The coevolution of social learning and sensitivity to changing environments

AO_SCPLOWBSTRACTC_SCPLOWThere is widespread agreement that social and individual learning are adaptations to varying environments. However, existing theory assumes that organisms cannot detect changes in the environment and instead adapt to averages. This paper develops the first analytical model that allows for the simultaneous coevolution of socially learned traditions, reliance on social learning, and signal detection for environmental change. There are numerous conditions under which detection can be stable once common but cannot invade the population when rare. When signal detection is maintained by selection, it always leads to pure separating equilibria at which organisms always learn individually when they believe the environment has recently changed and otherwise always learn socially. Detection can increase mean fitness at equilibrium, but it may also reduce it.

evolutionary biology↗