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Lau, H.

Publications and source records attributed to Lau, H..

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Domain-general enhancements of metacognitive ability through adaptive training

The metacognitive ability to introspect about self-performance varies substantially across individuals. Given that effective monitoring of performance is deemed important for effective behavioural control, intervening to improve metacognition may have widespread benefits, for example in educational and clinical settings. However, it is unknown whether and how metacognition can be systematically improved through training independently of task performance, or whether metacognitive improvements generalize across different task domains. Across 8 sessions, here we provided feedback to two groups of participants in a perceptual discrimination task: an experimental group (N = 29) received feedback on their metacognitive judgments, while an active control group (N = 32) received feedback on their decision performance only. Relative to the control group, adaptive training led to increases in metacognitive calibration (as assessed by Brier scores) which generalized both to untrained stimuli and an untrained task (recognition memory). Leveraging signal detection modeling we found that metacognitive improvements were driven both by changes in metacognitive efficiency (meta-d/d) and confidence level, and that later increases in metacognitive efficiency were positively mediated by earlier shifts in confidence. Our results reveal a striking malleability of introspection and indicate the potential for a domain-general enhancement of metacognitive abilities.

animal behavior and cognition

Individual susceptibility to TMS affirms the precuneual role in meta-memory upon recollection

BackgroundA recent virtual-lesion study using inhibitory repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) confirmed the causal behavioral relevance of the precuneus in the evaluation of ones own memory performance (aka mnemonic metacognition).\n\nObjectiveThis studys goal is to elucidate how these TMS-induced neuromodulatory effects might relate to the neural correlates and be modulated by individual anatomical profiles in relation to meta-memory.\n\nMethodsIn a within-subjects design, we assessed the impact of 20-min rTMS over the precuneus, compared to the vertex, across three magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) neuro-profiles on 18 healthy subjects during a memory versus a perceptual task.\n\nResultsTask-based functional MRI revealed that BOLD signal magnitude in the precuneus is associated with variation in individual meta-memory efficiency, and such correlation diminished significantly following TMS targeted at the precuneus. Moreover, individuals with higher resting-state functional connectivity (rs-fcMRI) between the precuneus and the hippocampus, or smaller grey matter volume in the stimulated precuneal region exhibit considerably higher vulnerability to the TMS effect. These effects were not observed in the perceptual domain.\n\nConclusionWe provide compelling evidence in outlining a possible circuit encompassing the precuneus and its mnemonic midbrain neighbor the hippocampus at the service of realizing our meta-awareness during memory recollection of episodic details.\n\nHighlightsO_LITMS on precuneus reduces meta-memory ability during memory retrieval.\nC_LIO_LITMS disrupts the correlation between BOLD activity and meta-memory ability.\nC_LIO_LITMS effect is modulated by rs-fcMRI between precuneus and hippocampus.\nC_LIO_LIIndividuals with greater precuneal grey matter volume more immune to TMS effect.\nC_LI

neuroscience

Causal evidence for mnemonic metacognition in human precuneus

Metacognition is the capacity to introspectively monitor and control ones own cognitive processes. Previous anatomical and functional neuroimaging findings implicated the important role of precuneus in metacognition processing, especially during mnemonic tasks. However, the issue of whether this medial parietal cortex is a domain-specific region that supports mnemonic metacognition remains controversial. Here, we focally disrupted this parietal area with repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation in healthy participants of both sexes, seeking to ascertain its functional necessity for metacognition for memory versus perceptual decisions. Perturbing the precuneal activity impaired the metacognitive efficiency selectively in the memory judgment of temporal-order, but not in perceptual discrimination. Moreover, the correlation in individuals metacognitive efficiency between the domains disappeared when the precuneus was perturbed. Together with the previous finding that lesion to the anterior prefrontal cortex impairs perceptual but not mnemonic metacognition, we double dissociated the macro-anatomical underpinnings for the two kinds of metacognitive capacity in an interconnected network of brain regions.\n\nSIGNIFICANCE STATEMENTTheories on the neural basis of metacognition have thus far largely centered on the role of prefrontal cortex. Here we refined the theoretical framework through characterizing a unique precuneal involvement in mnemonic metacognition with a noninvasive but inferentially powerful method: transcranial magnetic stimulation. By quantifying meta-cognitive efficiency across two distinct domains (memory vs. perception) that are matched for stimulus characteristics, we reveal an instrumental - and highly selective - role of the precuneus in mnemonic metacognition. These causal evidence corroborate ample clinical reports that parietal lobe lesions often produce inaccurate self-reports of confidence in memory recollection and establish that the precuneus as a nexus for the introspective ability to evaluate the success of memory judgment in humans.

neuroscience

Continuous flash suppression and monocular pattern masking impact subjective awareness similarly

Peters & Lau (2015) found that when criterion bias is controlled for, there is no evidence for unconscious visual perception in normal observers, in the sense that they cannot directly discriminate a target above chance without knowing it. One criticism of that study is that the visual suppression method used, forward and backward masking (FBM), may be too blunt in the way it interferes with visual processing to allow for unconscious forced-choice discrimination. To investigate this question we compared FBM directly to continuous flash suppression (CFS) in a two-interval forced choice task. Although CFS is popular, and may be thought of as a more powerful visual suppression technique, we found no difference in the degree of perceptual impairment between the two suppression types. To the extent that CFS impairs perception, both objective discrimination and subjective awareness are impaired to similar degrees under FBM. This pattern was consistently observed across 3 experiments in which various experimental parameters were varied. These findings provide evidence for an ongoing debate about unconscious perception: normal observers cannot perform forced-choice discrimination tasks unconsciously.

animal behavior and cognition

Inflation versus filling-in: why we feel we see more than we actually do in peripheral vision

Do we perceive fine details in the visual periphery? Here, we propose that phenomenology in the visual periphery can be characterized by an inflated sense of perceptual capacity, as observers overestimate the quality of their perceptual inputs. Distinct from the well-known perceptual phenomenon of \"filling-in\" where perceptual content is generated or completed endogenously, inflation can be characterized by incorrect introspection at the subjective level. The perceptual content itself may be absent or weak (i.e., not necessarily filled-in), and yet such content is mistakenly regarded by the system as rich. Behaviorally, this can be reflected by metacognitive deficits in the degree to which confidence judgments track task accuracy, and decisional biases for observers to think particular items are present, even when they are not. In two experiments using paradigms which exploit unique attributes of peripheral vision (crowding and summary statistics), we provide evidence that both types of deficits are present in peripheral vision, as observers reports are marked by overconfidence in discrimination judgments and high numbers of false alarms in detection judgments. We discuss potential mechanisms which may be the cause of inflation and propose future experiments to further explore this unique sensory phenomenon.

animal behavior and cognition

Liberal Detection Bias in the Unattended Periphery during Simulated Driving

While people often think they veridically perceive much of the visual surround, recent findings indicate that when asked to detect targets such as gratings embedded in visual noise, observers make more false alarms in the unattended periphery. Do these results from psychophysics studies generalize to naturalistic settings? We used a modern game engine to create a simulated driving environment where participants (as drivers) had to make judgments about the colors of pedestrians clothing in the periphery. Confirming our hypothesis based on previous psychophysics studies, we found that subjects showed liberal biases for unattended locations when detecting specific colors of pedestrians clothing. A second experiment showed that this finding was not simply due to a confirmation bias in decision-making when subjects were uncertain. Together, these results support the idea that in everyday visual experience, there is subjective inflation of experienced detail in the periphery, which may happen at the decisional level.

animal behavior and cognition

Subjective inflation of color saturation in the periphery under temporal overload

A long-standing puzzle in perception concerns the subjective impression of vivid color experience in the periphery. While peripheral color processing is not entirely insensitive, the subjective vividness seems unsupported by the relative paucity of representation in the periphery. Inspired by the flashed face distortion effect, in which peripheral faces are perceived as somewhat exaggerated or distorted when they are preceded by flashes of other faces in the same location, we attempted to create an equivalent illusion in the domain of color. The hypothesis is that under temporal overload, patches of colorful dots may be perceived as more exaggerated in terms of saturation. We confirmed this hypothesis with the observation of a significant effect of modest magnitude, which was replicated in a second experiment. These results suggest that subjective inflation of perceived color saturation does occur in the periphery, when the perceptual system is sufficiently occupied temporally and spatially. We discuss the relationship between the observed effects with previous findings of liberal detection biases in the unattended periphery.

neuroscience

Finding domain-general metacognitive mechanisms requires using appropriate tasks

An important yet unresolved question is whether or not metacognition consists of domain-general or domain-specific mechanisms. While most studies on this topic suggest a dissociation between metacognitive abilities at the neural level, there are conflicting reports at the behavioral level. Specifically, while McCurdy et al. (2013) found a positive correlation between metacognitive efficiency for visual perception and memory, Baird et al. (2013) didnt find this correlation. One possible explanation for this disparity is that the former included two-alternative-forced choice (2AFC) judgments in both their visual and memory tasks, whereas the latter used 2AFC for one task and yes/no (YN) judgments for the other. In support of this hypothesis, we ran two online experiments meant to mirror McCurdy et al. (2013) and Baird et al. (2013) with considerable statistical power (n=100), and replicated the main findings of both studies. This suggests the finding of McCurdy et al (2013) was not a fluke (i.e. false positive). In a third experiment with the same sample size, which included YN judgments for both tasks, we did not find a correlation between metacognitive functions, suggesting that the conflict between McCurdy et al. (2013) and Baird et al. (2013) stemmed from the use of YN judgments in the latter study. Our results underscore the need to avoid conflating 2AFC and YN judgments, which is a common problem.

neuroscience

On a ‘failed’ attempt to manipulate conscious perception with transcranial magnetic stimulation to prefrontal cortex

It has been reported that continuous theta burst transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) impairs metacognitive awareness in visual perception (Rounis et al., 2010). Bor et al. (2017) recently attempted to replicate this result. However, the authors modified the experimental design of the original study considerably, meaning that this was not strictly a replication. In some cases, the changes are a priori expected to lower the chance of obtaining positive findings. Despite these changes, the researchers in fact still found an effect similar to Rounis et al.s, but they claimed that it was necessary to adopt certain criteria to discard {bsim}30% of their subjects, after which a null result was reported. Using computer simulations, we evaluated whether the subject exclusion criteria Bor et al. adopted was appropriate or beneficial. We found that, contrary to their intended purpose, excluding subjects by their criteria does not actually reduce false positive rates. Taking into account both their positive result (without subject exclusion) and negative result (after exclusion) in a Bayesian framework, we further found that their results suggest a 75% or greater likelihood that TMS to DLPFC does in fact impair metacognition, directly contradicting their claim of replication failure. That lesion and chemical inactivation studies are known to demonstrate positive effects in similar paradigms further suggests that Bor et al.s alleged negative finding cannot be taken as evidence against the role of the prefrontal cortex in conscious perception in general.

neuroscience

A random dot kinematogram for online visual psychophysics

Web-{-}based experiments using visual stimuli have become increasingly common in recent years, but many frequently-used stimuli in vision research have yet to be developed for online platforms. Here, we introduce the first open access random-dot kinematogram (RDK) for use in web browsers. This fully customizable RDK offers options to implement several different types of noise (random position, random walk, random direction) and parameters to control aperture shape, coherence level, the number of dots, and other features. We include links to commented JavaScript code for easy implementation in web-based experiments, as well as an example of how this stimulus can be integrated as a plugin with a JavaScript library for online studies (jsPsych).

neuroscience

Domain-Specific Patterns of Activity Support Metacognition in Human Prefrontal Cortex

AO_SCPLOWBSTRACTC_SCPLOWMetacognition is the capacity to evaluate the success of ones own cognitive processes in various domains, e.g. memory and perception. It remains controversial whether metacognition relies on a domain-general resource that is applied to different tasks, or whether self-evaluative processes are domain-specific. Here we directly investigated this issue by examining the neural substrates engaged when metacognitive judgments were made by human participants during perceptual and memory tasks matched for stimulus and performance characteristics. By comparing patterns of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) activity while subjects evaluated their performance, we revealed both domain-specific and domain-general metacognitive representations. Multi-voxel activity patterns in anterior prefrontal cortex predicted levels of confidence in a domain-specific fashion, whereas domain-general signals predicting confidence and accuracy were found in a widespread network in the frontal and posterior midline. The demonstration of domain-specific metacognitive representations suggests the presence of a content-rich mechanism available to introspection and cognitive control.\n\nSO_SCPLOWIGNIFICANCEC_SCPLOW O_SCPLOWSTATEMENTC_SCPLOWWe use human neuroimaging to investigate processes supporting memory and perceptual metacognition. It remains controversial whether metacognition relies on a global resource that is applied to different tasks, or whether self-evaluative processes are specific to particular tasks. Using multivariate decoding methods, we provide evidence that perceptual- and memory-specific metacognitive representations cortex co-exist with generic confidence signals. Our findings reconcile previously conflicting results on the domain-specificity/generality of metacognition, and lay the groundwork for a mechanistic understanding of metacognitive judgments.

neuroscience

Towards an Unconscious Neurotherapy for Common Fears

Can evolutionarily hardwired fear responses, e.g. for spiders and snakes, be reprogramed unconsciously in the human brain? Currently, exposure therapy is amongst the most effective treatments for anxiety disorders1, but this intervention is subjectively aversive to patients, and rates of premature attrition from treatment have been reported to be as high as 70%2. Here we introduce a novel method to bypass the subjective unpleasantness in conscious exposure, by directly pairing monetary reward with unconscious occurrences of decoded representations of naturally feared objects in the brain. The typical way to identify multivoxel functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) representations for feared objects involves repeated presentations of the relevant images explicitly to subjects. However, for our potential treatment method to be effective in actual clinical settings, we need to decode fear representations without triggering excessively aversive reactions which may cause patients to dropout from treatments prematurely. Here we overcome this challenge by capitalizing on recent advancements in fMRI decoding techniques: We employed a method called hyperalignment3,4 to infer the relevant representations of feared objects for a designated participant based on data from other surrogate participants. This way the procedure completely bypasses the need for the conscious encountering of feared objects. We demonstrate that our method can lead to reliable reductions in physiological fear responses measured by skin conductance as well as amygdala hemodynamic activity. Not only do these results raise the intriguing possibility that naturally occurring fear can be re-programmed outside of conscious awareness, importantly they also created the rare opportunity for a psychological intervention of this nature to be tested rigorously in a double-blind placebo-controlled fashion. This may pave the way for a novel treatment method, combining the appealing rationale and proven efficacy of conventional psychotherapy with the rigor and leverage of clinical neuroscience.

neuroscience

Superior Colliculus Neuronal Ensemble Activity Signals Optimal Rather Than Subjective Confidence

Recent studies suggest that neurons in sensorimotor circuits involved in perceptual decision-making also play a role in decision confidence. In these studies, confidence is often considered to be an optimal readout of the probability that a decision is correct. However, the information leading to decision accuracy and the report of confidence often co-varied, leaving open the possibility that there are actually two dissociable signal types in the brain: signals that correlate with decision accuracy (optimal confidence) and signals that correlate with subjects behavioral reports of confidence (subjective confidence). We recorded neuronal activity from a sensorimotor decision area, the superior colliculus (SC) of monkeys, while they performed two different tasks. In our first task, decision accuracy and confidence co-varied, as in previous studies. In our second task, we implemented a novel motion discrimination task with stimuli that were matched for decision accuracy but produced different levels of confidence as reflected by behavioral reports. We used a multivariate decoder to predict monkeys choices from neuronal population activity. As in previous studies on perceptual decision-making mechanisms, we found that neuronal decoding performance increased as decision accuracy increased. However, when decision accuracy was matched, performance of the decoder was similar between high and low subjective confidence conditions. These results show that the SC likely signals optimal decision confidence similar to previously reported cortical mechanisms, but is unlikely to play a critical role in subjective confidence. The results also motivate future investigations to determine where in the brain signals related to subjective confidence reside.\n\nSignificance StatementConfidence is thought to reflect the rational or optimal belief concerning ones choice accuracy. Here, we introduce a novel version of the dot-motion discrimination task with stimulus conditions that produce similar accuracy but different subjective behavioral reports of confidence. We decoded decision performance of this task from neuronal signals in the superior colliculus (SC), a subcortical region involved in decision-making. We found that SC activity signaled a perceptual decision for visual stimuli, with the strength of this activity reflecting decision accuracy, but not the subjective level of confidence as reflected by behavioral reports. These results demonstrate an important role for the SC in perceptual decision-making and challenge current ideas about how to measure subjective confidence in monkeys and humans.

neuroscience

Should A Few Null Findings Falsify Prefrontal Theories Of Conscious Perception?

Is activity in prefrontal cortex (PFC) critical for conscious perception? Major theories of consciousness make distinct predictions about the role of PFC, providing an opportunity to arbitrate between these views empirically. Here we address three common misconceptions: i) PFC lesions do not affect subjective perception; ii) PFC activity does not reflect specific perceptual content; iii) PFC involvement in studies of perceptual awareness is solely driven by the need to make reports required by the experimental tasks, rather than subjective experience per se. These claims are incompatible with empirical findings, unless one focuses only on studies using methods with limited sensitivity. The literature highlights PFCs essential role in enabling the subjective experience in perception, contra the objective capacity to perform visual tasks; conflating the two can also be a source of confusion.

neuroscience