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Kiebel, S. J.

Publications and source records attributed to Kiebel, S. J..

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Meta-control of the exploration-exploitation dilemma emerges from probabilistic inference over a hierarchy of time scales

Cognitive control is typically understood as a set of mechanisms which enable humans to reach goals that require integrating the consequences of actions over longer time scales. Importantly, using routine beheavior or making choices beneficial only at a short time scales would prevent one from attaining these goals. During the past two decades, researchers have proposed various computational cognitive models that successfully account for behaviour related to cognitive control in a wide range of laboratory tasks. As humans operate in a dynamic and uncertain environment, making elaborate plans and integrating experience over multiple time scales is computationally expensive, the specific question of how uncertain consequences at different time scales are integrated into adaptive decisions remains poorly understood. Here, we propose that precisely the problem of integrating experience and forming elaborate plans over multiple time scales is a key component for better understanding how human agents solve cognitive control dilemmas such as the exploration-exploitation dilemma. In support of this conjecture, we present a computational model of probabilistic inference over hidden states and actions, which are represented as a hierarchy of time scales. Simulations of goal-reaching agents instantiating the model in an uncertain and dynamic task environment show how the exploration-exploitation dilemma may be solved by inferring meta-control states which adapt behaviour to changing contexts.

neuroscience

Dynamic integration of forward planning and heuristic preferences during multiple goal pursuit

Selecting goals and successfully pursuing them in an uncertain and dynamic environment is an important aspect of human behaviour. In order to decide which goal to pursue at what point in time, one has to evaluate the consequences of ones actions over future time steps by forward planning. However, when the goal is still temporally distant, detailed forward planning can be prohibitively costly. One way to select actions at minimal computational costs is to use heuristics. It is an open question how humans mix heuristics with forward planning to balance computational costs with goal reaching performance. To test a hypothesis about dynamic mixing of heuristics with forward planning, we used a novel stochastic sequential two-goal task. Comparing participants decisions with an optimal full planning agent, we found that at the early stages of goal-reaching sequences, in which both goals are temporally distant and planning complexity is high, on average 42% (SD = 19%) of participants choices deviated from the agents optimal choices. Only towards the end of the sequence, participants behaviour converged to near optimal performance. Subsequent model-based analyses showed that participants used heuristic preferences when the goal was temporally distant and switched to forward planning when the goal was close. Author summaryWhen we pursue our goals, there is often a moment when we recognize that we did not make the progress that we hoped for. What should we do now? Persevere to achieve the original goal, or switch to another goal? Two features of real-world goal pursuit make these decisions particularly complex. First, goals can lie far into an unpredictable future and second, there are many potential goals to pursue. When potential goals are temporally distant, human decision makers cannot use an exhaustive planning strategy, rendering simpler rules of thumb more appropriate. An important question is how humans adjust the rule of thumb approach once they get closer to the goal. We addressed this question using a novel sequential two-goal task and analysed the choice data using a computational model which arbitrates between a rule of thumb and accurate planning. We found that participants decision making progressively improved as the goal came closer and that this improvement was most likely caused by participants starting to plan ahead.

animal behavior and cognition

Balancing control: a Bayesian interpretation of habitual and goal-directed behavior

In everyday life, our behavior varies on a continuum from automatic and habitual to deliberate and goal-directed. Recent evidence suggests that habit formation and relearning of habits operate in a context-dependent manner: Habit formation is promoted when actions are performed in a specific context, while breaking off habits is facilitated after a context change. It is an open question how one can computationally model the brains balancing between context-specific habits and goal-directed actions. Here, we propose a hierarchical Bayesian approach for control of a partially observable Markov decision process that enables conjoint learning of habits and reward structure in a context-specific manner. In this model, habit learning corresponds to an updating of priors over policies and interacts with the learning of the outcome contingencies. Importantly, the model is solely built on probabilistic inference, which effectively provides a simple explanation of how the brain may balance contributions of habitual and goal-directed control. We illustrated the resulting behavior using agent-based simulated experiments, where we replicated several findings of devaluation, extinction, and renewal experiments, as well as the so-called two-step task which is typically used with human participants. In addition, we show how a single parameter, the habitual tendency, can explain individual differences in habit learning and the balancing between habitual and goal-directed control. Finally, we discuss the link of the proposed model to other habit learning models and implications for understanding specific phenomena in substance use disorder.

neuroscience