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Huettel, S. A.

Publications and source records attributed to Huettel, S. A..

4 recordsLinked to original sources

Between heuristics and optimality: Flexible integration of cost and evidence during information sampling

Effective decision making in an uncertain world requires balancing the benefits of acquiring relevant information with the costs of delaying choice. Optimal strategies for information sampling can be accurate but computationally expensive, whereas heuristic strategies are often computationally simple but rigid. To characterize the computations that underlie information sampling, we examined choice processes in human participants who sampled sequences of images (e.g. indoor and outdoor scenes) and attempted to infer the majority category (e.g. indoor or outdoor) under two reward conditions. We examined how behavior maps onto potential information sampling strategies. We found that choices were best described by a flexible function that lay between optimality and heuristics; integrating the magnitude of evidence favoring each category and the number of samples collected thus far. Integration of these criteria resulted in a trade-off between evidence and samples collected, in which the strength of evidence needed to stop sampling decreased linearly as the number of samples accumulated over the course of a trial. This non-optimal trade-off best accounted for choice behavior even under high reward contexts. Our results demonstrate that unlike the optimal strategy, humans are performing simple accumulations instead of computing expected values, and that unlike a simple heuristic strategy, humans are dynamically integrating multiple sources of information in lieu of using only one source. This evidence-by-costs tradeoff illustrates a computationally efficient strategy that balances competing motivations for accuracy and cost minimization.

animal behavior and cognition↗

Peer presence increases adolescents' prosocial behavior by speeding the evaluation of rewards for others

Peer presence can elicit maladaptive adolescent decision-making, potentially by increasing sensitivity to the rewards one receives. It remains unknown whether peer presence also increases adolescents sensitivity to others rewards, which could have an adaptive effect in contexts allowing pro-social behaviors. Here, we combine social utility modeling and real-time decision process modeling to characterize how peer presence alters adolescents processing of self and other rewards. We found that adolescents behaved selfishly when privately allocating rewards for themselves and a peer in an incentive-compatible task. In peer presence, however, adolescents became more altruistic. Real-time estimates of reward processing collected using computer mouse tracking showed that altruistic behavior was associated with relatively earlier processing of peer-rewards relative to self-rewards, such that peer presence sped peer-reward processing without altering self-reward processing. Our results indicate a causal mechanism through which peer presence prompts greater prosocial behavior by altering how adolescents process prosocial outcomes.

neuroscience↗

Dietary self-control depends on the latency and rate of information accumulation

The drift diffusion model (DDM) provides a parsimonious explanation of decisions across neurobiological, psychological, and behavioral levels of analysis. Although most DDM implementations assume that only a single value guides decisions, choices often involve multiple attributes that could make separable contributions to choice. Here, we fit incentive-compatible dietary choices to a multi-attribute, time-dependent drift diffusion model (mtDDM), in which taste and health could differentially influence the evidence accumulation process. We found that these attributes shaped both the relative value signal and the latency of evidence accumulation in a manner consistent with participants idiosyncratic preferences. Moreover, by using a dietary prime, we showed how a healthy choice intervention alters mtDDM parameters that in turn predict prime-dependent choices. Our results reveal that different decision attributes make separable contributions to the strength and timing of evidence accumulation - providing new insights into the construction of interventions to alter the processes of choice.

neuroscience↗

Reason’s Enemy Is Not Emotion: Engagement of Cognitive Control Networks Explains Biases in Gain/Loss Framing

In the classic gain/loss framing effect, describing a gamble as a potential gain or loss biases people to make risk-averse or risk-seeking decisions, respectively. The canonical explanation for this effect is that frames differentially modulate emotional processes - which in turn leads to irrational choice behavior. Here, we evaluate the source of framing biases by integrating functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data from 143 human participants performing a gain/loss framing task with meta-analytic data from over 8000 neuroimaging studies. We found that activation during choices consistent with the framing effect were most correlated with activation associated with the resting or default brain, while activation during choices inconsistent with the framing effect most correlated with the task-engaged brain. Our findings argue against the common interpretation of gain/loss framing as a competition between emotion and control. Instead, our study indicates that this effect results from differential cognitive engagement across decision frames.\n\nSignificance StatementThe biases frequently exhibited by human decision-makers have often been attributed to the presence of emotion. Using a large fMRI sample and analysis of whole-brain networks defined with the meta-analytic tool Neurosynth, we find that neural activity during frame-biased decisions are more significantly associated with default behaviors (and the absence of executive control) than with emotion. These findings point to a role for neuroscience in shaping longstanding psychological theories in decision science.

neuroscience↗