Biology subjects

Hester, R.

Publications and source records attributed to Hester, R..

12 recordsLinked to original sources

bioRxiv2026

When Tagging Frequency Matters to Attention: Effects on SSVEPs, ERPs, and Cognitive Processing

Selective attention enables the prioritization of task-relevant information while managing distractors, and steady-state visual evoked potentials (SSVEPs) are widely used to track this process by tagging different visual objects at distinct flicker frequencies. However, whether the choice of tagging frequency itself influences other neural and cognitive measures remains unclear. Here, 27 participants performed detection and 1-back working memory tasks while a central target and peripheral distractors flickered at either 8.6 Hz or 12 Hz. The working memory task produced slower responses, more errors, and greater perceived difficulty than detection. Tagging frequency strongly shaped neural responses, with 8.6 Hz eliciting higher SSVEP signal-to-noise ratios than 12 Hz regardless of stimulus location. Nevertheless, stronger SSVEP responses for centrally attended stimuli were associated with fewer working memory errors and larger early visual ERP responses, while SSVEPs for attended and distractor stimuli were negatively correlated. In addition, the working memory task produced a larger P1-N1 peak-to-peak difference, and tagging frequency altered the timing and amplitude of early ERP effects. Together, these findings show that tagging frequency is not a neutral methodological parameter, but one that shapes both neural indices of attention and their relationship to cognitive performance.

neuroscience↗

bioRxiv2025

Tracing the neural trajectories of evidence accumulation and motor preparation processes during voluntary decisions

Voluntary decisions have previously been described by where they arise in the brain and how actions corresponding to ones choice are prepared. However, the processes by which these internally guided decisions are formed and translated into action remain unclear. We tested whether neural signatures of evidence accumulation and motor preparation - established in perceptual decision-making - are also observed during voluntary decisions. Forty-nine adults made voluntary (free choice between two options) and forced (single specified choice) decisions while electroencephalography was recorded. To isolate decision formation from action selection, all responses were made with a right-handed keypress. After applying signal deconvolution and current source density transformations, we examined three signals: the centro-parietal positivity (CPP), Mu/Beta (8 - 30 Hz) amplitudes, and a left-hemisphere readiness potential contralateral to the response hand. For both voluntary and forced decisions, CPP and Mu/Beta amplitudes showed hallmark accumulation-to-bound dynamics - faster responses had steeper ramping signals that converged to stereotyped pre-response amplitude levels. The left-hemisphere readiness potential likewise showed convergence to a pre-response level but with less reliable evidence for RT-dependent slope scaling, resembling a late, effector-specific motor gate rather than an evolving decision variable. Waveform amplitudes across the time course of these signals also did not differ reliably between voluntary and forced decisions. Our results indicate that, like perceptual decisions, voluntary choices are also formed by a graded accumulation process that culminates in a motor action, with the CPP indexing an evolving decision variable and Mu/Beta indexing effector-specific motor readiness.

neuroscience↗

bioRxiv2023

Neural correlates of confidence during decision formation in a perceptual judgment task

When we make a decision, we also estimate the probability that our choice is correct or accurate. This probability estimate is termed our degree of decision confidence. Recent work has reported event-related potential (ERP) correlates of confidence both during decision formation (the centro-parietal positivity component; CPP) and after a decision has been made (the error positivity component; Pe). However, there are several measurement confounds that complicate the interpretation of these findings. More recent studies that overcome these issues have so far produced conflicting results. To better characterise the ERP correlates of confidence we presented participants with a comparative brightness judgment task while recording electroencephalography. Participants judged which of two flickering squares (varying in luminance over time) was brighter on average. Participants then gave confidence ratings ranging from "surely incorrect" to "surely correct". To elicit a range of confidence ratings we manipulated both the mean luminance difference between the brighter and darker squares (relative evidence) and the overall luminance of both squares (absolute evidence). We found larger CPP amplitudes in trials with higher confidence ratings. This association was not simply a by-product of differences in relative evidence (which covaries with confidence) across trials. We did not identify postdecisional ERP correlates of confidence, except when they were artificially produced by pre-response ERP baselines. These results provide further evidence for neural correlates of processes that inform confidence judgments during decision formation.

neuroscience↗

bioRxiv2023

People with a tobacco use disorder misattribute non-drug cues as worse predictors of positive outcomes compared to drug cues

Adaptive behaviours depend on dynamically updating internal representations of the world based on the ever-changing environmental contingencies. People with a substance use disorder (pSUD) show maladaptive behaviours with high persistence in drug-taking, despite severe negative consequences. We recently proposed a salience misattribution model for addiction (SMMA; Kalhan et al., (2021)), arguing that pSUD have aberrations in their updating processes where drug cues are misattributed as strong predictors of positive outcomes, but weaker predictors of negative outcomes. We also argue that conversely, non-drug cues are misattributed as weak predictors of positive outcomes, but stronger predictors of negative outcomes. However, these hypotheses need to be empirically tested. Here we used a multi-cue reversal learning task, with reversals in whether drug or non-drug cues are currently relevant in predicting the outcome (monetary win or loss). We show that compared to controls, people with a tobacco use disorder (pTUD), do form misaligned internal representations. We found that pTUD updated less towards learning the drug cues relevance in predicting a loss. Further, when neither drug nor non-drug cue predicted a win, pTUD updated more towards the drug cue being relevant predictors of that win. Our Bayesian belief updating model revealed that pTUD had a low estimated likelihood of non-drug cues being predictors of wins, compared to drug cues, which drove the misaligned updating. Overall, several hypotheses of the SMMA were supported, but not all. Our results implicate that strengthening the non-drug cue association with positive outcomes may help restore the misaligned internal representation in pTUD.

neuroscience↗

bioRxiv2023

Reward prediction-errors weighted by cue salience produces addictive behaviors in simulations, with asymmetrical learning and steeper delay discounting

Dysfunction in learning and motivational systems are thought to contribute to addictive behaviours. Previous models have suggested that dopaminergic roles in learning and motivation could produce addictive behaviours through pharmacological manipulations that provide excess dopaminergic signalling towards these learning and motivational systems. Redish 2004 suggested a role based on dopaminergic signals of value prediction error, while Zhang et al. 2009 suggested a role based on dopaminergic signals of motivation. Both these models present significant limitations. They do not explain the reduced sensitivity to drug-related costs/negative consequences, the increased impulsivity generally found in people with a substance use disorder, craving behaviours, and non-pharmacological dependence, all of which are key hallmarks of addictive behaviours. Here, we propose a novel mathematical definition of salience, that combines aspects of dopamines role in both, learning and motivation, within the reinforcement learning framework. Using a single parameter regime, we simulated addictive behaviours that the Zhang et al. 2009 and Redish 2004 models also produce but we went further in simulating the downweighting of drug-related negative prediction-errors, steeper delay discounting of drug rewards, craving behaviours and aspects of behavioural/non-pharmacological addictions. The current salience model builds on our recently proposed conceptual theory that salience modulates internal representation updating and may contribute to addictive behaviours by producing misaligned internal representations (Kalhan et al., 2021). Critically, our current mathematical model of salience argues that the seemingly disparate learning and motivational aspects of dopaminergic functioning may interact through a salience mechanism that modulates internal representation updating.

neuroscience↗

bioRxiv2022

Bayesian Accounts of Perceptual Decisions in the Nonclinical Continuum of Psychosis: Greater Imprecision in Both Top-down and Bottom-up Processes

Neurocomputational accounts of psychosis propose mechanisms for how information is integrated into a predictive model of the world, in attempts to understand the occurrence of altered perceptual experiences. Conflicting Bayesian theories postulate aberrations in either top-down or bottom-up processing. The top-down theory predicts an overreliance on prior beliefs or expectations resulting in aberrant perceptual experiences, whereas the bottom-up theory predicts an overreliance on current sensory information, as aberrant salience is directed towards objectively uninformative stimuli. This study empirically adjudicates between these models. We use a perceptual decision-making task in a neurotypical population with varying degrees of psychotic-like experiences. Bayesian modelling was used to compute individuals reliance on prior relative to sensory information. Across two datasets (discovery dataset n=363; independent replication in validation dataset n=782) we showed that psychotic-like experiences were associated with an overweighting of sensory information relative to prior expectations, which seem to be driven by decreased precision afforded to prior information. However, when prior information was more uncertain, participants with greater psychotic-like experiences encoded sensory information with greater noise. Greater psychotic-like experiences were also associated with generally heightened perceptions of task instability, which we suggest may be the cause for the observed aberrant precision in the encoding both prior and likelihood information. Our study lends empirical support to notions of both weaker bottom-up and weaker (rather than stronger) top-down perceptual processes, as well as aberrancies in belief updating that extend into the non-clinical continuum of psychosis.

neuroscience↗

bioRxiv2022

Examining the Neural Correlates of Error Awareness in a Large fMRI Study

Goal-directed behaviour is dependent upon the ability to detect errors and implement appropriate post-error adjustments. Accordingly, several studies have explored the neural activity underlying error-monitoring processes, identifying the insula cortex as crucial for error awareness and reporting mixed findings with respect to the anterior cingulate cortex. Variable patterns of activation have previously been attributed to insufficient statistical power. We therefore sought to clarify the neural correlates of error awareness in a large event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) study. Four hundred and two healthy participants undertook the error awareness task, a motor Go/No-Go response inhibition paradigm in which participants were required to indicate their awareness of commission errors. Compared to unaware errors, aware errors were accompanied by significantly greater activity in a network of regions including the insula cortex, supramarginal gyrus, and midline structures such as the anterior cingulate cortex and supplementary motor area. Error awareness activity was related to indices of task performance and dimensional measures of psychopathology in selected regions including the insula, supramarginal gyrus and supplementary motor area. Taken together, we identified a robust and reliable neural network associated with error awareness.

neuroscience↗

bioRxiv2021

People with nicotine dependence use-disorder exhibit more prefrontal activity during preparatory control but reduced anterior cingulate activity during reactive control

Reduced inhibitory control and a hypersensitivity to reward are key deficits in drug-dependents, however, they tend to be studied in isolation. Here we seek to understand the neural processes underlying control over reward and how this is different in people with a nicotine use disorder (pNUD). A novel variant of the monetary incentive delay task was performed by pNUD (n = 20) and non-smokers (n = 20), where we added a stop-signal component such that participants had to inhibit prepotent responses to earn a larger monetary reward. Brain activity was recorded using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We estimated stop signal reaction times (SSRT), an indicator of impulsivity, and correlated these with brain activity. Inhibitory accuracy scores did not differ between the control group and pNUD. However, pNUD had slower SSRTs, suggesting that they may find it harder to inhibit responses. Brain data revealed that pNUD had greater preparatory control activity in the middle frontal gyrus and inferior frontal gyrus prior to successful inhibitions over reward. In contrast, non-smokers had greater reactive control associated with more activity in the anterior cingulate cortex during these successful inhibitions. SSRT-brain activity correlations revealed that pNUD engaged more control related prefrontal brain regions when SSRTs are slower. Overall, whilst the inhibition accuracy scores were similar between groups, differential neural processes and strategies were used to successfully inhibit a prepotent response. The findings suggest that increasing preparatory control in pNUD may be one possible treatment target in order to increase inhibitory control over reward.

neuroscience↗

bioRxiv2021

Electrophysiological correlates of confidence differ across correct and erroneous perceptual decisions

Every decision we make is accompanied by an estimate of the probability that our decision is accurate or appropriate. This probability estimate is termed our degree of decision confidence. Recent work has uncovered event-related potential (ERP) correlates of confidence both during decision formation and after a decision has been made. However, the interpretation of these findings is complicated by methodological issues related to ERP amplitude measurement that are prevalent across existing studies. To more accurately characterise the neural correlates of confidence, we presented participants with a difficult perceptual decision task that elicited a broad range of confidence ratings. We identified a frontal ERP component within an onset prior to the behavioural response, which exhibited more positive-going amplitudes in trials with higher confidence ratings. This frontal effect also biased measures of the centro-parietal positivity (CPP) component at parietal electrodes via volume conduction. Amplitudes of the error positivity (Pe) component that followed each decision were negatively associated with confidence for trials with decision errors, but not for trials with correct decisions, with Bayes factors providing moderate evidence for the null in the latter case. We provide evidence for both pre- and post-decisional neural correlates of decision confidence that are observed in trials with correct and erroneous decisions, respectively. Our findings suggest that certainty in having made a correct response is associated with frontal activity during decision formation, whereas certainty in having committed an error is instead associated with the post-decisional Pe component. These findings also highlight the possibility that some previously reported associations between decision confidence and CPP/Pe component amplitudes may have been a consequence of ERP amplitude measurement-related confounds. Re-analysis of existing datasets may be useful to test this hypothesis more directly. Highlights- We mapped the event-related potential correlates of decision confidence - A frontal component was associated with confidence during decision formation - The error positivity component was associated with confidence in error trials - The error positivity was not associated with confidence in correct response trials

neuroscience↗

bioRxiv2021

Divergent effects of absolute evidence magnitude on decision accuracy and confidence in perceptual judgements

Whether people change their mind after making a perceptual judgement may depend on how confident they are in their decision. Recently, it was shown that, when making perceptual judgements about stimuli containing high levels of absolute evidence (i.e., the overall magnitude of sensory evidence across choice options), people make less accurate decisions and are also slower to change their mind and correct their mistakes. Here we report two studies that investigated whether high levels of absolute evidence also lead to increased decision confidence. We used a luminance judgment task in which participants decided which of two dynamic, flickering stimuli was brighter. After making a decision, participants rated their confidence. We manipulated relative evidence (i.e., the mean luminance difference between the two stimuli) and absolute evidence (i.e., the summed luminance of the two stimuli). In the first experiment, we found that higher absolute evidence was associated with decreased decision accuracy but increased decision confidence. In the second experiment, we additionally manipulated the degree of luminance variability to assess whether the observed effects were due to differences in perceived evidence variability. We replicated the results of the first experiment but did not find substantial effects of luminance variability on confidence ratings. Our findings support the view that decisions and confidence judgments are based on partly dissociable sources of information, and suggest that decisions initially made with higher confidence may be more resistant to subsequent changes of mind.

neuroscience↗

bioRxiv2020

An initial 'snapshot' of sensory information biases the likelihood and speed of subsequent changes of mind

We often need to rapidly change our mind about perceptual decisions in order to account for new information and correct mistakes. One fundamental, unresolved question is whether information processed prior to a decision being made ( pre-decisional information) has any influence on the likelihood and speed with which that decision is reversed. We investigated this using a luminance discrimination task in which participants indicated which of two flickering greyscale squares was brightest. Following an initial decision, the stimuli briefly remained on screen, and participants could change their response. Using psychophysical reverse correlation, we examined how moment-to-moment fluctuations in stimulus luminance affected participants decisions. This revealed that the strength of even the very earliest (pre-decisional) evidence was associated with the likelihood and speed of later changes of mind. To account for this effect, we propose an extended diffusion model in which an initial snapshot of sensory information biases ongoing evidence accumulation. Author SummaryTo avoid harm in an ever-changing world we need to be able to rapidly change our minds about our decisions. For example, imagine being unable to overrule a decision to run across a street when you realise a speeding car is approaching. In this study, we examined the information processing dynamics which underlie perceptual judgements and changes of mind. By reverse correlating participants decisions with the moment-to-moment sensory evidence they received, we show that the very earliest information, processed prior to an initial decision being made, can have a lasting influence over the speed and likelihood of subsequent changes of mind. To account for this, we develop a model of perceptual decisions in which initial sensory evidence exerts a lasting bias over later evidence processing. When fit to participants behavioural responses alone, this model predicted their observed information usage patterns. This suggests that an initial snapshot of sensory information may influence the ongoing dynamics of the perceptual decision process, thus influencing the speed and likelihood of decision reversals.

animal behavior and cognition↗

bioRxiv2019

Tracking dynamic adjustments to decision making and performance monitoring processes in conflict tasks

How we exert control over our decision-making has been investigated using conflict tasks, which involve stimuli containing elements that are either congruent or incongruent. In these tasks, participants adapt their decision-making strategies following exposure to incongruent stimuli. According to conflict monitoring accounts, conflicting stimulus features are detected in medial frontal cortex, and the extent of experienced conflict scales with response time (RT) and frontal theta-band activity in the electroencephalogram (EEG). However, the consequent adjustments to decision processes following response conflict are not well-specified. To characterise these adjustments and their neural implementation we recorded EEG during a modified Flanker task. We traced the time-courses of performance monitoring processes (frontal theta) and multiple processes related to perceptual decision-making. In each trial participants judged which of two overlaid gratings forming a plaid stimulus (termed the S1 target) was of higher contrast. The stimulus was divided into two sections, which each contained higher contrast gratings in either congruent or incongruent directions. Shortly after responding to the S1 target, an additional S2 target was presented, which was always congruent. Our EEG results suggest enhanced sensory evidence representations in visual cortex and reduced evidence accumulation rates for S2 targets following incongruent S1 stimuli. Results of a follow-up behavioural experiment indicated that the accumulation of sensory evidence from the incongruent (i.e. distracting) stimulus element was adjusted following response conflict. Frontal theta amplitudes positively correlated with RT following S1 targets (in line with conflict monitoring accounts). Following S2 targets there was no such correlation, and theta amplitude profiles instead resembled decision evidence accumulation trajectories. Our findings provide novel insights into how cognitive control is implemented following exposure to conflicting information, which is critical for extending conflict monitoring accounts.

neuroscience↗