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Frömer, R.

Publications and source records attributed to Frömer, R..

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Dissociable neural signals for reward and emotion prediction errors

Reinforcement learning models focus on reward prediction errors (PEs) as the driver of behavior. However, recent evidence indicates that deviations from emotion expectations, termed affective PEs, play a crucial role in shaping behavior. Whether there is neural separability between emotion and reward signals remains unknown. We employ electroencephalography during social learning to investigate the neural signatures of reward and affective PEs. Behavioral results reveal that while affective PEs predict choices when little is known about how a partner will behave, reward PEs become more predictive overtime as uncertainty about a partners behavior diminishes. This functional dissociation is mirrored neurally by engagement of distinct event-related potentials. The FRN indexes reward PEs while the P3b tracks affective PEs. Only the P3b predicts subsequent choices, highlighting the mechanistic influence of affective PEs during social learning. These findings present evidence for a neurobiologically viable emotion learning signal that is distinguishable--behaviorally and neurally--from reward. SignificanceFor nearly a century, scientists have asked how humans learn about their worlds. Learning models borrowed from computer science--namely, reinforcement learning--provide an elegant and simple framework that showcases how reward prediction errors are used to update ones knowledge about the environment. However, a fundamental question persists: what exactly is reward? This gap in knowledge is problematic, especially when we consider the multiplicity of social contexts where external rewards must be contextualized to gain value and meaning. We leverage electroencephalography to interrogate the role of emotion prediction errors--violations of emotional expectations--during learning. We observe distinct neural signals for reward and emotion prediction errors, suggesting that emotions may act as a bridge between external rewards and subjective value.

neuroscience↗

Mutual inclusivity improves decision-making by smoothing out choice's competitive edge

Decisions form a central bottleneck to most tasks, one that people often experience as costly. Past work proposes mitigating those costs by lowering ones threshold for deciding. Here, we test an alternative solution, one that targets the basis for most choice costs: that choosing one option sacrifices others (mutual exclusivity). Across 5 studies (N = 462), we test whether this tension can be relieved by framing choices as inclusive (allowing selection of more than one option, as in buffets). We find that inclusivity makes choices more efficient, by selectively reducing competition between potential responses as participants accumulate information for each of their options. Inclusivity also made participants feel less conflicted, especially when they couldnt decide which good option to keep or which bad option to get rid of. These inclusivity benefits were also distinguishable from the effects of manipulating decision threshold (increased urgency), which improved choices but not experiences thereof.

neuroscience↗

Phantom controllers: Misspecified models create the false appearance of adaptive control during value-based choice

Decision scientists have grown increasingly interested in how people adaptively control their decision making, exploring how metacognitive factors like uncertainty or conflict influence how people accumulate evidence and commit to a choice. For example, a recent study proposed that options values contribute to both the formation of a decision and the effortful invigoration of a response. Here, the control process was operationalized in a drift diffusion model as the lowering of the decision threshold on difficult trials. Reanalyzing the data from this experiment, we establish alternative explanations for these findings. We show that the reported evidence for controlled threshold adjustments can be explained away by task confounds, time-dependent collapses in decision thresholds, and stimulus-driven dynamics in alternative decision frameworks. With regard to the individual study, our findings challenge the reported evidence for this new theory of motivated control. More generally, we reveal paths and pitfalls in computational approaches to understanding when and how control guides decision-making.

animal behavior and cognition↗