Biology subjects

Filipowicz, A. L. S.

Publications and source records attributed to Filipowicz, A. L. S..

4 recordsLinked to original sources

bioRxiv2026

Suboptimal human inference reflects an efficient and flexible information bottleneck

Human inference is often suboptimal in ways that vary across individuals and tasks. We propose that at least some of this variability reflects information-processing limits. To test this idea, we developed a task-general application of the information-bottleneck framework to quantify how much information individuals use (information capacity) and how effectively they use it (information efficiency). We applied this framework to human choice behavior on two distinct inference tasks and found that individual differences in performance were driven largely by variation in information capacity, while information efficiency remained consistently high. This pattern of variable capacity and high efficiency also applied to a subset of participants who appeared inefficient overall, but were efficient when evaluated relative to a simplified (heuristic) encoding of the observations. Regardless of whether participants based their strategies on full or simplified encodings, they tended to adjust their performance to different task demands by changing their information capacity while maintaining efficiency. We interpret these findings in terms of new analytical results linking optimal inference under information-capacity constraints to evidence-based choice noise, suggesting that a key driver of human behavioral variability is rational adaptation to flexible information-processing limits.

neuroscience↗

bioRxiv2021

Dynamic Representation of the Subjective Value of Information

To improve future decisions, people should seek information based on the value of information (VOI), which depends on the current evidence and the reward structure of the upcoming decision. When additional evidence is supplied, people should update VOI to adjust subsequent information seeking, but the neurocognitive mechanisms of this updating process remain unknown. We used a modified beads task to examine how the VOI is represented and updated in the human brain. We theoretically derived, and empirically verified, a normative prediction that the VOI depends on decision evidence and is biased by reward asymmetry. Using fMRI, we found that the subjective VOI is represented in right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). Critically, this VOI representation was updated when additional evidence was supplied, showing that DLPFC dynamically tracks the up-to-date VOI over time. These results provide new insights into how humans adaptively seek information in the service of decision making.

neuroscience↗

bioRxiv2020

The complexity of model-free and model-based learning strategies

Different learning strategies are thought to fall along a continuum that ranges from simple, inflexible, and fast "model-free" strategies, to more complex, flexible, and deliberative "model-based strategies". Here we show that, contrary to this proposal, strategies at both ends of this continuum can be equally flexible, effective, and time-intensive. We analyzed behavior of adult human subjects performing a canonical learning task used to distinguish between model-free and model-based strategies. Subjects using either strategy showed similarly high information complexity, a measure of strategic flexibility, and comparable accuracy and response times. This similarity was apparent despite the generally higher computational complexity of model-based algorithms and fundamental differences in how each strategy learned: model-free learning was driven primarily by observed past responses, whereas model-based learning was driven primarily by inferences about latent task features. Thus, model-free and model-based learning differ in the information they use to learn but can support comparably flexible behavior. Statement of RelevanceThe distinction between model-free and model-based learning is an influential framework that has been used extensively to understand individual- and task-dependent differences in learning by both healthy and clinical populations. A common interpretation of this distinction that model-based strategies are more complex and therefore more flexible than model-free strategies. However, this interpretation conflates computational complexity, which relates to processing resources and generally higher for model-based algorithms, with information complexity, which reflects flexibility but has rarely been measured. Here we use a metric of information complexity to demonstrate that, contrary to this interpretation, model-free and model-based strategies can be equally flexible, effective, and time-intensive and are better distinguished by the nature of the information from which they learn. Our results counter common interpretations of model-free versus model-based learning and demonstrate the general usefulness of information complexity for assessing different forms of strategic flexibility.

neuroscience↗

bioRxiv2019

Pupil diameter encodes the idiosyncratic, cognitive complexity of belief updating

Pupils tend to dilate in response to surprising events, but it is not known whether these responses are primarily stimulus driven or instead reflect a more nuanced relationship between pupil-linked arousal systems and cognitive expectations. Using an auditory adaptive decision-making task, we show that evoked pupil diameter is more parsimoniously described as signaling violations of learned, top-down expectations than changes in low-level stimulus properties. We further show that both baseline and evoked pupil diameter is modulated by the degree to which individual subjects use these violations to update their subsequent expectations, as reflected in the complexity of their updating strategy. Together these results demonstrate a central role for idiosyncratic cognitive processing in how arousal systems respond to new inputs and, via our complexity-based analyses, provide a unified framework for understanding these effects in terms of both inference processes aimed to reduce belief uncertainty and more traditional notions of mental effort.

neuroscience↗