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Eissa, T. L.

Publications and source records attributed to Eissa, T. L..

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Learning efficient representations of heterogeneity in attractors for working memory

Experience shapes our expectations and helps us learn the structure of the environment. Inference models render such learning as a gradual refinement of the observers estimate of the environmental prior. For instance, when retaining an estimate of an objects features in working memory, learned priors may bias the estimate in the direction of common feature values. Humans display such biases when retaining color estimates on short time intervals. We propose that these systematic biases emerge from modulation of synaptic connectivity in a neural circuit based on the experienced stimulus history, shaping the persistent and collective neural activity that encodes the stimulus estimate. Resulting neural activity attractors are aligned to common stimulus values. Using recently published human response data from a delayed-estimation task in which stimuli (colors) were drawn from a heterogeneous distribution that did not necessarily correspond with reported population biases, we confirm that most subjects response distributions are better described by experience-dependent learning models than by models with no learned biases. This work suggests that systematic limitations in working memory reflect efficient representations of inferred environmental structure, providing new insights into how humans integrate environmental knowledge into their cognitive strategies.

neuroscience↗

Normative decision asymmetries with symmetric priors but asymmetric evidence

Solutions to challenging inference problems are often subject to a fundamental trade-off between bias (being systematically wrong) that is minimized with complex inference strategies and variance (being oversensitive to uncertain observations) that is minimized with simple inference strategies. However, this trade-off is based on the assumption that the strategies being considered are optimal for their given complexity and thus has unclear relevance to the frequently suboptimal inference strategies used by humans. We examined inference problems involving rare, asymmetrically available evidence, which a large population of human subjects solved using a diverse set of strategies that were suboptimal relative to the Bayesian ideal observer. These suboptimal strategies reflected an inversion of the classic bias-variance trade-off: subjects who used more complex, but imperfect, Bayesian-like strategies tended to have lower variance but high bias because of incorrect tuning to latent task features, whereas subjects who used simpler heuristic strategies tended to have higher variance because they operated more directly on the observed samples but displayed weaker, near-normative bias. Our results yield new insights into the principles that govern individual differences in behavior that depends on rare-event inference, and, more generally, about the information-processing trade-offs that are sensitive to not just the complexity, but also the optimality of the inference process.

neuroscience↗