Chetverikov, A. | bioRxiv Science

bioRxiv2021

Effortless integration of probabilistic visual input

Current theories of perception suggest that the brain represents features of the world as probability distributions, but can such uncertain foundations provide the basis for everyday vision? Perceiving objects and scenes requires knowing not just how features (e.g., colors) are distributed but also where they are and which other features they are combined with. Using a Bayesian computational model, we recover probabilistic representations used by human observers to search for odd stimuli among distractors. Importantly, we found that the brain integrates information between feature dimensions and spatial locations, leading to more precise representations compared to when information integration is not possible. We also uncover representational asymmetries and biases, showing their spatial organization and arguing against simplified "summary statistics" accounts. Our results confirm that probabilistically encoded visual features are bound with other features and to particular locations, proving how probabilistic representations can be a foundation for higher-level vision.

neuroscience↗

bioRxiv2020

Dual strategies in human confidence judgments

Although confidence is commonly believed to be an essential element in decision making, it remains unclear what gives rise to ones sense of confidence. Recent Bayesian theories propose that confidence is computed, in part, from the degree of uncertainty in sensory evidence. Alternatively, observers can use physical properties of the stimulus as a heuristic to confidence. In the current study, we developed ideal observer models for either hypothesis and compared their predictions against human data obtained from psychophysical experiments. Participants reported the orientation of a stimulus, and their confidence in this estimate, under varying levels of internal and external noise. As predicted by the Bayesian model, we found a consistent link between confidence and behavioral variability for a given stimulus orientation. Confidence was higher when orientation estimates were more precise, for both internal and external sources of noise. However, we observed the inverse pattern when comparing between stimulus orientations: although observers gave more precise orientation estimates for cardinal orientations (a phenomenon known as the oblique effect), they were more confident about oblique orientations. We show that these results are well explained by a strategy to confidence that is based on the perceived amount of noise in the stimulus. Altogether, our results suggest that confidence is not always computed from the degree of uncertainty in ones perceptual evidence, but can instead be based on visual cues that function as simple heuristics to confidence.

neuroscience↗