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Chen, O. Y.

Publications and source records attributed to Chen, O. Y..

2 recordsLinked to original sources

The Biological Basis of Mathematical Beauty

Through our past studies of the neurobiology of beauty, we have come to divide aesthetic experiences into two broad categories: biological and artifactual. The aesthetic experience of biological beauty is dictated by inherited brain concepts, which are resistant to change even in spite of extensive experience. The experience of artifactual beauty on the other hand is determined by post-natally acquired concepts, which are modifiable throughout life by exposure to different experiences (Zeki, 2009). Hence, in terms of aesthetic rating, biological beauty (in which we include the experience of beautiful faces or human bodies) is characterized by less variability between individuals belonging to different ethnic origins and cultural backgrounds or the same individual at different times. Artifactual beauty (in which we include the aesthetic experience of human artifacts such as buildings and cars) is characterized by greater variability between individuals belonging to different ethnic and cultural groupings and by the same individual at different times. In this paper, we present results to show that the experience of mathematical beauty (Zeki et al 2014), even though it constitutes an extreme example of beauty that is dependent upon (mathematical) culture and learning, belongs to the biological category and obeys one of its characteristics, namely a lesser variability in terms of the aesthetic ratings given to mathematical formulae experienced as beautiful.

neuroscience

The Bayesian-Laplacian Brain

We outline what we believe could be an improvement in future discussions of the brain acting as a Bayesian-Laplacian system. We do so by distinguishing between two broad classes of priors on which the brains inferential systems operate: in one category are biological priors ({beta} priors) and in the other artifactual ones ( priors). We argue that {beta} priors, of which colour categories and faces are good examples, are inherited or acquired very rapidly after birth, are highly or relatively resistant to change through experience, and are common to all humans. The consequence is that the probability of posteriors generated from {beta} priors having universal assent and agreement is high. By contrast, priors, of which man-made objects are examples, are acquired post-natally and modified at various stages throughout post-natal life; they are much more accommodating of, and hospitable to, new experiences. Consequently, posteriors generated from them are less likely to find universal assent. Taken together, in addition to the more limited capacity of experiment and experience to alter the {beta} priors compared to priors, another cardinal distinction between the two is that the probability of posteriors generated from {beta} priors having universal agreement is greater than that for priors. The two categories are not, however, always totally distinct and can merge into one another to varying extents, resulting in posteriors that draw upon both categories.

neuroscience