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Charles, L.

Publications and source records attributed to Charles, L..

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Integrating explicit reliability for optimal choices: effect of trustworthiness on decisions and metadecisions

A key challenge in todays fast-paced digital world is to integrate information from various sources, which differ in their reliability. Yet, little is known about how explicit probabilistic information about the likelihood that a source provides correct information is used in decision-making. Here, we investigated how such explicit reliability markers are integrated and the extent to which individuals have metacognitive insight into this process. We developed a novel paradigm where participants viewed opinions from sources of varying reliability to make a choice between two options. After each decision, they rated how much they felt a given source influenced their choice. Using computational modelling, we estimated the effective reliability that participants assigned to each source and how leaky their decision process was. Overall, we found that participants acted as if sources were more informative than they actually were, inflating the reliability they were communicated. Interestingly, we show that even though sources were explicitly labelled as unreliable, these sources biased choices, as if these were treated as moderately reliable. Additionally, the presence of sources known to be lying, reliably voting for the incorrect answer, impaired performance by increasing decision leakiness. Despite these biases, participants showed some metacognitive awareness of what influenced their choices: they were generally accurate in reporting the degree to which a source influenced them and were aware of the impact unreliable sources had on their decisions. These results suggest that people make suboptimal use of explicit source reliability, but have some awareness of their suboptimal choices. Author summaryIn everyday life, we constantly draw on information from multiple sources that differ in how much they can be trusted. When scrolling through social media or online platforms, for instance, we know some sources are reliable, others dubious, and some clearly misleading. In this study, we created a simple task mirroring this everyday challenge to examine how people form beliefs using information from sources of known, varying reliability. Using a computational model, we uncovered two systematic ways in which decisions fell short of optimal. First, sources that were clearly identified as unreliable still influenced the opinions and final choice of individuals. Second, peoples choices were often swayed by the last piece of information they saw, especially in a context where misleading sources were present. Surprisingly, participants were aware of some of these biases and could report which sources had shaped their choices, suggesting that awareness of bias is not necessarily sufficient to overcome it.

neuroscience↗

Freedom from habits: the capacity for autonomous behaviour

Humans and some other animals can autonomously generate action choices that contribute to solving complex problems. However, experimental investigations of the cognitive bases of human autonomy are challenging, because experimental paradigms typically constrain behaviour using controlled contexts, and elicit behaviour by external triggers. In contrast, autonomy and freedom imply unconstrained behaviour initiated by endogenous triggers. Here we propose a new theoretical construct of adaptive autonomy, meaning the capacity to make behavioural choices that are free from constraints of both immediate external triggers and of routine response patterns, but nevertheless show appropriate coordination with the environment. Participants (N = 152) played a competitive game in which they had to choose the right time to act, in the face of an opponent who punished (in separate blocks) either choice biases (such as always responding early), sequential patterns of action timing across trials (such as early, late, early, late...), or predictable action-outcome dependence (such as win-stay, lose-shift). Adaptive autonomy was quantified as the ability to maintain performance when each of these influences on action selection was punished. We found that participants could become free from habitual choices regarding when to act and could also become free from sequential action patterns. However, they were not able to free themselves from influences of action-outcome dependence, even when these resulted in poor performance. These results point to a new concept of autonomous behaviour as flexible adaptation of voluntary action choices in a way that avoids stereotypy. In a sequential analysis, we also demonstrated that participants increased their reliance on belief learning in which they attempt to understand the competitors beliefs and intentions, when transition bias and reinforcement bias were punished. Taken together, our study points to a cognitive mechanism of adaptive autonomy in which competitive interactions with other agents could promote both social cognition and volition in the form of non-stereotyped action choices.

neuroscience↗

Evidence for metacognitive bias in perception of voluntary action

Studies of metacognition often measure confidence in perceptual decisions. Much less is known about metacognition of action, and specifically about how people estimate the success of their own actions. In the present study, we compare metacognitive abilities between voluntary actions, passive movements matched to those actions, and purely visual signals. Participants reported their confidence in judging whether a brief visual probe appeared ahead or behind of their finger during simple flexion/extension movement. The finger could be moved voluntarily, or could be moved passively by a robot replaying their own previous movements. In a third condition, participants did not move, but a visual cursor replayed their previous voluntary movements. Metacognitive sensitivity was comparable when judging active movements, during passive finger displacement and visual cursor reply. However, a progressive metacognitive bias towards overconfidence was found for passive and for voluntary movements. Taken together, our results may partly explain some of the peculiarities that arise when one judges ones own actions.

neuroscience↗