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Arnold, D. H.

Publications and source records attributed to Arnold, D. H..

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Comparing the aftereffects of motion and causality across visual co-ordinates

Albert Michotte (1946/1963) introduced causality into the realm of experimental phenomenology. He disputed Humes (1739/1978) claim that the impression of causality comes only from conscious inference. Since then, causality adaptation studies have suggested that the visual perception of causality undergoes sensory adaptation, akin to the retinally-specific aftereffects of motion or orientation adaptation. Here we present 5 Experiments that, together, dispute a view of retinotopically-mapped neural populations dedicated to causality detection. We first point to key issues in previous studies of causality adaptation. Then we extend the basic causality adaptation paradigm to show that causality aftereffects occur in spatially global visual space. We directly compare causality aftereffects to the motion aftereffect to show important differences in their co-ordinate mapping. Our data point to a role for cognitive inferences as being an important aspect of causality aftereffects, despite causal impressions being tightly constrained by sensory perception.

neuroscience

The implied motion aftereffect changes decisions, but not confidence

Viewing static images depicting movement can result in a motion aftereffect: people tend to categorise direction signals as moving in the opposite direction to the implied motion of still photographs. This finding could indicate that inferred motion direction can penetrate sensory processing and impact perception. Equally possible, however, is that inferred motion impacts decision processes, but not perception. Here we test these two possibilities. Since both categorical decisions and subjective confidence are informed by sensory information, confidence can be informative about whether an aftereffect likely results from changes to perceptual or decision processes. We therefore leveraged subjective confidence as an additional measure of the implied motion aftereffect. In Experiment 1 (implied motion), we find support for decision-level changes only, with no change in subjective confidence. In Experiment 2 (real motion), we find equal changes to decisions and confidence. Our results suggest the implied motion aftereffect produces a bias in decision-making, but leaves perceptual processing unchanged.

neuroscience